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ABSTRACT 
For many years, countless individuals have debated the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy. Some scholars argue that Islam and democracy are incompatible because of 
the nature of Islam and its core teachings, while others assert the idea of their 
compatibility by emphasizing democracy’s universality. Turkey, which is a 
predominantly Muslim, yet democratic country, is given as an example for the coherence 
and compatibility of Islam and democracy. More recent historic developments, beginning 
in Tunisia and continuing with other Middle Eastern countries, have triggered debates 
about the future direction of the political structure of these countries. The possibility of 
relatively strong fundamentalist-Islamist parties taking over after the collapse of existing 
governments has led to a reassessment of diverse democratization paths among not only 
Middle Eastern but also Western countries. Because of Turkey’s strategic location, its 
common history with the Middle East, its political and economic strength, and most 
importantly, because of its unique character as a predominantly Muslim yet secular, 
democratic, and modernizing, Turkey again is being reviewed as a potential role model 
for countries in the Middle East. This thesis, after examining the compatibility of Islam 
and democracy and the core reasons for the democracy deficit in the Middle East, 
discusses the consideration of Turkey as a model of democratization for predominantly 
Muslim countries in the region. Moreover, it explores how Turkish historical experiences 
with democratization can teach us about the process of attaining a democratic society, 
regardless of its religion. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
For many years, countless individuals have debated the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy. Some scholars argue that Islam and democracy are incompatible because of 
the nature of Islam and its core teachings, while others assert the idea of their 
compatibility by emphasizing democracy’s universality. Actually, nowadays, about half 
of the world’s Muslims live in democracies, near democracies, or in intermittent 
democracies.1 Overall, forty-three societies can be identified in which the majority of 
their population is Muslim. Among those, twenty-seven are not part of the Arab world 
and seven of them can be classified as liberal democracies.2 The scholars who support the 
idea that Islam and democracy are compatible offer the example of Turkey, which is a 
predominantly Muslim yet democratic country. According to many of them, Turkey 
should be seen as a role model for predominantly Muslim countries. Especially after the 
recent revolutionary movements in the Middle East, the Turkish model of 
democratization is being debated more broadly. This thesis examines considerations of 
Turkey as a model of democratization for predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle 
East. Moreover this thesis explores how Turkish historical experiences with 
democratization can teach us about the process of attaining a democratic society, 
regardless of its religion. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The suggestion of Turkey as a model of democratization emerged after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of Cold War. To many in the West, Turkey 
seemed like the natural model for state building and democratization in the newly 
independent Central Asian states.3 Moreover the adoption of the Broader Middle East 
                                                 
1 Alfred C. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the “Twin Tolerations,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 (October, 
2000): 48. (Also see Appendix) 
2 Michael Minkenberg, “Democracy and Religion: Theoretical and Empirical Observations on the Relationship 
between Christianity, Islam and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33, no. 6 (2007): 902, 
903. (Also see Appendix) 
3 Gareth Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London, UK: Brookings Institution Press, 1995). 
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and North Africa Initiative in the G-8 Summit in June 2004 revealed a degree of 
consensus among the major extra-regional actors in pushing for political and economic 
reform in the Middle East.4 This led to the reemergence of such claims, especially in the 
United States, about Turkey as a potential model for the project of democratization in the 
Islamic world.5 More recent historic developments, beginning in Tunisia and continuing 
with the other Middle Eastern countries, have triggered debates about the future direction 
of the political structure of these countries. The possibility of relatively strong Islamist 
parties taking over after the collapse of existing governments has led to a reassessment of 
diverse democratization paths among not only Middle Eastern, but also Western 
countries. Because of Turkey’s location, its history, its size, its strength, and, most 
importantly, because of its unique character as a country with a majority Muslim 
population that is secular, democratic, and modernizing,6 Turkey is again being reviewed 
as a potential model for countries in the Middle East. For these reasons, Turkey’s history 
of democratization offers a great example to many countries around the Middle East. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The major research question brings into consideration four distinct issues: (1) the 
compatibility of Islam and democracy; (2) the main reasons for a deficit of democracy in 
the Middle East; (3) the features of Turkey’s successful democracy transition; and (4) the 
potential of Turkey’s history of democratization to be seen as a “model” for other Middle 
Eastern countries. 
This thesis will address the first issue to show that there is no incompatibility 
between Islam and democracy. Although, according to some scholars,7 democracy is a 
Western idea that emerged in Europe after protracted struggles between the ruling elites 
and ordinary people, this thesis will support the universal values of democracy and claim 
that it can be adopted by many other countries regardless of their religions and cultures. 
                                                 
4 Meliha B. Altunışık, “The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East,” Arab Studies Quarterly 27, 
no. 1/2 (2005): 45. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 For more information see Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993). 
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The second issue this thesis explores is the reason for a lack of democracy in 
Middle Eastern countries. While exploring the persistence of authoritarian or semi-
authoritarian8 orders and the main causes of the persistent democracy deficit in these 
countries, this thesis will address the major and common problems of the Muslim 
countries of the region in terms of obstacles to the democratization process. This thesis 
asserts that it is neither religion nor public opinion that hinders democratization in these 
countries. On the contrary, compounded with social, political, and economic conditions, 
it is the ruling elites’ unwillingness to share their authority that hinders democratization 
in the Middle East. 
After exploring Turkey’s democratization history as the third issue, this thesis 
illustrates that the main threats to young democracies emerges after the establishment of 
its first democratic structure. In order to overcome this problem, this thesis emphasizes 
that the most important characteristics of Turkish democracy are: establishing reliable 
democratic institutions capable of protecting democracy against anti-democratic 
movements by drawing “the red lines”9 around them, promoting modern secular forms of 
education, and improving the social and economic conditions of the country as a whole. 
The fourth issue is the question of whether Turkey’s democratization process can 
generally be adopted as a model for the Middle Eastern Arab countries. By exploring the 
applicability of this path, this thesis emphasizes that democratization is not only a 
political process but is also a social, economic and cultural evolution. This chapter further 
argues that secularism and its protection through democratic institutions, in combination 
with economic improvements, is a prerequisite for democratization in a country where 
political fundamentalist Islam is the main challenge for democratization. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Study of the identified problems necessarily starts with the existing literature, 
examining the compatibility of Islam and democracy. By examining this notion, scholars 
                                                 
8 Marina Ottaway refers to the Middle Eastern regimes as semi-authoritarian because they combine the rhetoric of 
democracy with illiberal traits. 
9 I use the term “Red lines” as the limits in which the anti-democratic players were forced to stay. 
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have endeavored to eliminate the ideological challenge that hinders the people’s support 
for democracy. Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which the rulers 
are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly 
through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.10 Robert Dahl 
argues that the minimum requirements for democracy are: freedom to form and join 
organizations; freedom of expression; the right to vote; eligibility for public office; the 
right of political leaders to compete for support and vote; alternative source of 
information; free and fair elections; institutions for making government policies depend 
on votes and other expressions of preferences.11 Additionally, a state must respect the 
rule of law and equality of its citizens in order to be considered democratic. In light of 
these definitions, some scholars claim that democracy places sovereignty in the hands of 
the individual, but in Islam, sovereignty belongs solely to God, thereby reducing the 
individual to a mere agent with little concern for the exercise of creativity and personal 
freedom.12 In contrast to these theories, others argue that Islam is inherently democratic, 
not only because of the principles of consultation (shura), but also because of the 
concepts of independent reasoning (ijtihad) and consensus (ijma’).13 Many of them give 
Prophet Mohammad’s hadith as an example for freedom of speech and diversity of 
thought that: “Differences of opinion within my community is a sign of God’s mercy.” 
Moreover, Alfred Stepan writes that about half of the world’s Muslims, 435 million 
people (or over 600 million, if we include Indonesia), live in democracies, near-
democracies, or intermittent democracies14 in order to illustrate that popular thoughts of 
ordinary Muslims do not contradict the democratic notion. Stephen Hofmann states that 
“Simply because nondemocratic regimes are in place in a number of countries in the 
                                                 
10 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy is... and is not,” Journal of Democracy 2, no.3 
(Summer 1991): 76. 
11 Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971): 1, 3. 
12 Anwar Ibrahim, “Universal Values and Muslim Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 3 (2006): 6. 
13 John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, “Democratization and Islam,” The Middle East Journal 45, no. 3 
(1991): 434. 
14 Alfred C. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the “Twin Tolerations,”” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 
(October, 2000): 48. 
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Muslim world does not mean that the vast majority of these countries’ citizens are 
unsupportive of a democratic alternative.”15  
However, despite democratization in the world, Middle Eastern rulers have 
effectively resisted the emergence of democracy in their countries. Instead, they have 
masked their authoritarianism behind a façade of democratic procedures without the 
substance of a democratic rule. Regarding the reasons for the lack of democracy, Alfred 
Stepan argues that the “Islamic free-elections trap,” allowing free elections in Islamic 
countries would bring to power governments that would use these democratic freedoms 
to destroy democracy itself.16 For instance, the reluctant approach of the United States 
toward the resignation of President Mubarak during the Egyptian uprising was justified 
by many columnists by bringing up the “Islamic free-election trap.” Hence, Western 
countries and Middle Eastern reform supporters were not wholeheartedly in favor of 
democratization without establishing and consolidating the institutions that are capable of 
enforcing democracy. Moreover, this “Islamic free-election trap” was used by the 
authoritarian governments to justify their autocratic rule over the country. 
Michael L. Ross argues, in his article, that oil/gas/mineral resources, strategic 
transition ways, such as the Suez Canal, and international funding for the Middle Eastern 
states all hinder democracy because these factors provide the ability for the regimes to 
sustain their authoritarian behavior.17 In order to explain this argument, he emphasizes 
that the revenue of natural resources have rentier, repression, and modernization effects 
that prevent further democratic improvements in the Middle East. With the rentier effect, 
he means that the governments use the wealth of their countries for subsidizing their 
citizens, low taxation, and so on, in order to make them less enthusiastic for change and 
democracy. With the repression effect, he points out that these governments establish 
security organizations to suppress the people who pose a threat to their rules. And last, 
with the modernization effect, he emphasizes that the money coming from natural 
                                                 
15 Steven R. Hofmann, “Islam and Democracy: Micro-Level Indications of Compatibility,” Comparative Political 
Studies 37, no. 6 (2004): 672. 
16 Alfred C. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the “Twin Tolerations,”” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 
(October, 2000): 48. 
17 Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 356. 
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resources make people more reluctant to work and progress. Actually, many scholars 
agree on the effect of the military or security forces in maintaining the authoritarian 
environment in their countries. For instance, the rulers have close ties with the military 
and give them concessions in order to keep them loyal, appoint proven loyalist officers to 
strategic positions, reward them with untouched budgets, transform them into key 
economic players, and even marginalize the regular military and build their own loyal 
security forces. Hence, circumscribed with these concessions, the army hardly poses any 
challenge to the regime because it is one of the main beneficiaries of this authoritarian 
status quo.18 
In addition to these factors, there is also a lack of powerful and effective 
institutions in the Middle Eastern Arab countries, which causes a lack of horizontal and 
vertical accountability of the rulers, which in turn leads to durable authoritarianism. 
Eberhard Kienle discusses this issue and expresses that although there have been some 
institutional reforms in the Middle East, they have never led to centrally controlled 
institutions that can pull the country from central control and hold regimes accountable 
for their actions. He claims that the reason for this is that democracy promoters 
insufficiently reinforced these institutions that are supposed to contain and channel action 
towards democratic outcomes.19 Hence, insufficient democracy promotion, in terms of 
institutionalization, strengthens the hands of authoritarian regimes and leads to easy 
manipulation of these institutions. 
On the other hand, some, like Eberhard Kienle, address the issue from a different 
perspective, arguing that the Western countries’ pressures for democracy promotion 
entail reactions against foreign interference.20 Unquestionably, this anticipated reaction is 
because most of the Middle Eastern countries share the same history of colonization. 
Since they experienced colonization at the hands of a Western power, they see the 
                                                 
18 Philippe Droz-Vincent, “The Changing Role of Middle Eastern Armies,” in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: 
Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2007): 211. 
19 Eberhard Kienle, “Democracy Promotion and Renewal of Authoritarian Rule,” in Debating Arab 
Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2007): 246. 
20 Ibid., 239. 
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promotion of democracy by Western countries as just another form of Western 
colonization of their cultures. Hence, even the potential beneficiaries of these reforms 
oppose democracy promotion and gather around their existing authoritarian rulers against 
the anticipated foreign interference.21 
Apart from these internal, external, and even historical examples, many scholars 
argue that the foremost reason for this democracy deficit is the ruling elites’ lack of will 
for reforming their ruling structures and democratizing their countries. However, Turkey 
overcame many of these difficulties after the War of Independence with the guidance and 
will of Atatürk and many other men who supported him in the idea of a new Turkey. As a 
predominantly Muslim country, Turkey achieved the initial stages of democracy only 
after harsh struggles between those who represented its past and those who fought for an 
anticipated future. It was not easy for Turkey and its mostly pious population to adopt the 
“Western” idea of democratization. Indeed, it started during the late Ottoman era. 
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, Ottoman rulers started to realize the weakness 
of their army and the backwardness of their empire vis-a-vis Western countries. As 
Bernard Lewis states in his article, “this was a time of closer contact with the West, 
through the study of language, a growing Western presence in terms of merchants, 
educators, and, increasingly, military and naval personnel, and the beginnings of a 
significant Muslim, chiefly Ottoman presence in Western countries.”22 The last century 
of the Ottoman Empire witnessed unprecedented reforms including secular laws and 
education, financial, social, military and institutional arrangements that eventually led to 
the declaration of its first constitution and the foundation of its first assembly.23 
After the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the new 
Turkish Republic began to develop while establishing the infrastructure of democracy 
under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. While improving the institutional, 
                                                 
21 Eberhard Kienle, “Democracy Promotion and Renewal of Authoritarian Rule,” in Debating Arab 
Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2007): 239. 
22 Bernard Lewis, “Why Turkey is the Only Muslim Democracy,” Middle East Quarterly 1, no. 1 (March, 1994): 
41. 
23 For more information see Eric J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 
2004). 
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financial, and political structure of the country, secularism constituted the keystone of 
Turkish constitutional theory and political life.24 Turkish secularism has not meant 
simply a formal separation between religious and political authority and institutions, but 
rather a positivist state ideology to engineer a homogenous and stratified society.25 The 
ideology of secularism aimed to not only curtail religion in public space, but also to 
reduce it to the individual level. For this purpose, secularism was introduced to the 
constitution, together with the five other guiding principles of Kemalism:26 
republicanism, etatism, populism, nationalism, and reformism. 
Successive Turkish governments did wisely not attempt to introduce full 
democracy all at once, but instead went through successive phases of limited democracy, 
preparing the state and society for further development, and, at the same time, 
encouraging the rise of civil society.27 Thus, Democracy was gradually established 
beginning with the foundation of the republic in 1923, and as the cultural level of people 
became adequate to support it. For example, in the 1950 election, the Republican 
People’s Party (RPP) that had enjoyed a monopoly of political power for decades, 
allowed itself to lose a free election and submit itself to the will of its citizens.28 The 
Democrat Party (DP) entered this 1950 election and eventually won it. Thus, Turkey 
turned to a sustained competitive electoral regime.29 
Between 1950 and 2000, Turkey’s political life witnessed four military 
interventions that are generally considered as coups, though they were essentially for law 
                                                 
24 Serif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” in The Modern Middle East: A Reader, eds. Albert 
Hourani, Philip S. Khoury and Mary C. Wilson (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993): 347. 
25 M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009): 25. 
26 Serif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” in The Modern Middle East: A Reader, eds. Albert 
Hourani, Philip S. Khoury and Mary C. Wilson (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993): 365. 
27 Bernard Lewis, “Why Turkey is the Only Muslim Democracy,” Middle East Quarterly 1, no. 1 (March, 1994): 
45. 
28 Ibid., 44. 
29 Michele Penner Angrist, “Party Systems and Regime Formation in the Modern Middle East: Explaining 
Turkish Exceptionalism,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (January, 2004): 239. 
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and order reactions against an ideological polarization of the people.30 For this reason, 
these interventions were generally welcomed by the society and perceived as necessary 
for order and democracy in the country. According to Binnaz Toprak, during the fall of 
Erbakan’s Islamist government in 1997, although the military played an important role, 
there had been many democratic efforts by the civil society such as NGOs, labor unions, 
professional organizations, academicians, and business organizations, which explicitly 
showed the maturity of the people’s democratic understandings.31 In a nutshell, the 
democratic institutions, such as the judiciary, civil society, free media and press played a 
major role in drawing the red lines of democracy in Turkey’s democratization history. 
The military was only the exposed face, there to stand against anti-democratic forces, 
although its intervention was undemocratic, per se. However, it is obvious that in a 
democratically naive country, in order to protect the regime against its enemies, there has 
to be a powerful pro-democratic institution. As Binnaz Toprak writes, “a democratic 
environment provides a platform for the organization of anti-system parties while it 
forces them to limit their sphere of action and to moderate their ideology.”32 
In light of these features of Turkey’s history of democratization, some scholars 
argue that Turkey is, in itself, a unique example that it cannot be a model for political 
reform for the Islamic countries in the Middle East. In this respect, they argue that 
Turkey’s secularism, the unique role of Atatürk, its imperial state tradition inherited from 
its Ottoman legacy, and the absence of colonial legacy, makes the Turkish example 
unique.33 Moreover its close relationship with the West that started during the Ottoman 
era, adds to this unique character. On the other hand, the counter argument reminds us 
that the Middle Eastern countries also shared some of these features during the Ottoman 
                                                 
30 Ömer Taşpınar, “An Uneven Fit?: The “Turkish Model” and the Arab World.” Project on U.S. Relations with 
the Islamic World, The Brookings Institution (August 2003): 10. 
31 Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” Turkish Studies 6, no. 2 (June, 2005): 172. 
32 Ibid., 184. 
33 Ömer Taşpınar, “An Uneven Fit?: The “Turkish Model” and the Arab World.” Project on U.S. Relations with 
the Islamic World, The Brookings Institution (August 2003): 16, and for more information see Bernard Lewis, “Why 
Turkey is the Only Muslim Democracy,” Middle East Quarterly 1, no. 1 (March, 1994). 
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rule, such as secularization, interaction with Western countries and so on.34 Moreover, 
for decades, particularly after the foundation of the Middle East Partnership Initiative in 
2002 by the United States, many of the Middle Eastern countries have enjoyed the 
foreign aid offered to promote democracy in the region. 
Apart from these arguments, scholars argue over whether Turkey can be 
considered a model. There are many lessons that can be learned from its democratization 
history. For instance, Ömer Taşpınar argues that Turkey’s Kemalist transformation 
between 1923 and 1950 conveys three major lessons of relevance for the transition to 
democracy in the Arab World: (1) free elections should be seen as the culmination of the 
democratization process; (2) a clear separation of mosque and state may not be feasible, 
especially in the short-run; (3) establishing a positivist education system should be the 
top priority.35 He also mentions that the Turkish model does not mean an exact blueprint 
for necessary reforms. However, he emphasizes that it can offer relevant lessons from 
past political experience and a practical framework for a progressive agenda.36 
In light of these scholarly works on Turkey’s democratization history and its 
features, this thesis asserts that consolidation of the institutions, such as civil society, an 
independent judiciary and military; legislation of secular laws that would prevent the 
exploitation of people’s religious values by political actors; and promoting positivist 
education with economic improvements are the most important necessary conditions in 
the democratization process in the Middle East. 
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II. COMPATIBILITY OF ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 
Anwar Ibrahim writes that, regardless of people’s status, wealth, nationality or 
religion, attaining and sustaining the superiority of the law in every sphere of life is one 
of the most important issues in every society that is seeking to live in peace. He 
emphasizes the importance of the rule of law and illustrates the consequences of the lack 
of it by stating that: 
We don’t want our homes to be broken into and searched by the police 
without a court order, a court order that must be granted on legitimate 
grounds…We don’t want anyone to be held under arrest without explicit 
charges. We don’t want confessions extracted through torture, physical or 
psychological abuse, or any kind of threat or promise.37 
In addition to the rule of law, the political side of democracy requires a system of 
governance in which the rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm, 
by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected 
representatives.38 Furthermore, freedom of expression, freedom of speech, equality in 
justice, the right to elect and compete to be elected, and free and fair elections are the 
basic requirements that have to be fulfilled to call a system democratic. Actually, all of 
these features are the necessities of the others. For example, before attaining equality 
among the citizens, the right to vote and be elected cannot be guaranteed. Also, only with 
free and fair elections can freedom of choice and expression find its real meaning. 
Because the state has a legitimate monopoly on the use of force over a specified 
territory, when this unique authority is captured by any kind of domestic actors, this 
coercive force in wrong hands can lead to disastrous results, even to the destruction of the 
state. Alfred C. Stepan emphasizes in his article that a democratically elected government 
must rule within the confines of its constitution and be bound by the law and by a 
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complex set of vertical and horizontal institutions that help ensure accountability.39 
Without these political and legal institutions’ control over the government, holding the 
government and its forces accountable for their actions would be impossible. With this 
accountability, elected representatives will be obliged to answer the questions asked by 
their electorates or constitutional institutions. Therefore, a state’s implementation of force 
can be limited or shaped by these institutions. 
In democracies, free and fair elections are a legitimate way of transferring the 
authority of citizens to their representatives. The government members constrain their use 
of force and feel accountable for their actions during their governing period, not only 
because of their legal obligations, but also because they are concerned with their 
reelection. Moreover, securing the right of every person to express himself freely and 
have the right to form civil organizations that can hold rulers accountable for their actions 
is also a very important characteristic for a stable democracy. 
Having given the explanation and minimum requirements of democracy, one has 
to realize that democracy does not depend on a nations’ culture, their ethnicity, or even 
their religions. Democracy is a system of governance, and a developmental process is 
agreed upon to achieve a public welfare without the distinction of any kinds of language, 
religion, ethnicity or skin color. Democracy depends on pure equality, which literally 
stems from being human beings, per se. No other regime type can give the same freedom, 
equality, and participation in the governance to its citizens. Moreover, there is no regime 
type that has the same respect that democracy has toward the rule of law: 
Tawhid (the conviction and witnessing that there is no God but God and 
Muhammad is His prophet) is the core of the Islamic religious experience 
and, therefore, the consequence of it is that God is unique and His will is 
the imperative and guide for all lives, which means that there can be only 
one sovereign and that is God.40  
According to this fact, many Muslim or non-Muslim scholars argue that Islam and 
democracy are incompatible mainly because of the concept of sovereignty contradiction 
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between them.41 Moreover, many others claim that, in Islam, the law was defined and 
promulgated by God and that God’s law could not be altered by popular will.42 In line 
with these views, in Samuel Huntington’s theory called “the clash of civilizations” the 
relationship between Islam and democracy takes more attention from him. He asserts that 
“God’s being Caesar” in Islam is the fundamental obstacle for any successful 
democratization and, thus, lacks any prospect for democracy in Muslim societies.43 
Many scholars assert that democracy, which is the rule of humans, contradicts 
with Islam, which is the rule of God. For instance, Iranian author Sayyid Rizvi, asserts 
that the Islamic system, from the beginning to end, is “for Allah” and if it is done “for the 
people,” it is called “hidden polytheism.”44 Alfred Stepan, while discussing the 
separation of religion and the state in Islam, argues that it is the lack of space for 
democratic public opinion in making laws that is seen as deriving from the Koran, in 
which God dictated to the Prophet Muhammad the content of fixed laws that a good 
Islamic polity must follow.45 
It is claimed that, in Islam, laws are made not by the people, but by Allah and the 
people are required to follow without making any comments and suggestions about these 
laws and legislations.46 According to Abul-Ala-Mawdudi, in democracy, the people of a 
country are governed by the rules which they themselves have framed and all the 
inhabitants of that country should obey this democratic authority. But in Islam, he asserts, 
Allah alone is the owner of the land and the lawgiver to all human beings. Thus, He alone 
must be obeyed and served, and all affairs of men must be conducted according to His 
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rules.47 For this reason, some Muslim scholars support that because Islamic principles are 
transcendental and cannot be undermined by popular whim, which is the source of law in 
democracies, Islam and democracy are inherently incompatible.48 
There are also some scholars who go beyond these fundamental controversies 
when discussing Islam and democracy. It is obvious that one of the main features of 
democracy is the equality of the people under law. Anne-Marie Delcambre asserts, in her 
book, that in its founding texts, Islam is against equality and Islamic law (sharia) and is 
profoundly non-egalitarian. According to her, in Islam, the Muslim is above the non-
Muslim, the believer is above the atheist, the man is above the woman, and the free man 
is above the slave.49 Moreover, she continues by claiming that for Islam, man is a slave, a 
servant of God, and as such, he has no rights. Hence, the democratic understanding of 
man, which means having rights only for being a human, is both inconceivable and 
intolerable in Islam.50 She asserts that being a believer makes one respected in Islam, 
which is fundamentally incompatible with democratic principles. 
Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, rejects the 
democratic concept of government by arguing that although parliamentary and 
constitutional systems are compatible with the Islamic system of government, founding 
different political parties is a potential threat to Islamic unity.51 He believes that these 
political parties would make the Muslim community separate into different groups, and 
ruin the community’s unity. Instead of founding political parties, he supported the idea 
that the ummah (Muslim community) ought to be joined in one party,52 which is actually 
contrary to the plurality principle of democracy. Another leading member of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood organization, Sayyid Qutb, argues that both Islam and democracy 
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are incompatible due to God’s sole sovereignty in Islam. But on the other hand, Abul Ala 
Mawdudi, a major 20th century Islamist thinker, believed that Islam was democratic 
because of its legitimate institutions of shura (decision-making process by consultation). 
By rejecting the idea of secularism in democracy, he interpreted the concept of 
democracy and Islam in a particular way, calling his system a “theo-democracy” or 
“democracy under God”53 in which the behavior of the people is constrained by God’s 
divine rules. He asserted that those who are in charge of the affairs of the people and who 
run them on their behalf, must be appointed by the free will of the people and they should 
only administer and govern through consultation in order to obtain the consent of the 
people.54 
When one first approaches Islam and its teachings, it is probable for him to 
perceive that since Islam places sovereignty solely to God, and shows the way to pray 
and the way to live, it does not leave people a free space to interpret its religion and its 
worldly surroundings in order to achieve development in their lives. Anwar Ibrahim 
expresses his objection to this narrow understanding by labeling it a misreading of the 
sources of religion and this misreading represents a capitulation to extremist discourse.55 
He further argues that, actually, freedom is the fundamental objective of the divine Islam 
and Islam has always expressed the primacy of justice, which is a close approximation of 
the West’s definition of freedom.56 In addition, John Esposito and James Piscatori assert 
that Islam is inherently democratic, not only because of the principles of consultation, but 
also because of the Islamic principles of independent reasoning and consensus.57 
Actually, when one compares the views that support the idea of compatibility and 
which rejects that idea, one can conclude with many examples that support the former 
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view. John O. Voll, after examining the Koranic verses relating to political and social life 
of the early Muslim community, concludes that, the principles on which the political 
system of Islam was grounded were thoroughly democratic in character.58 According to 
Voll, the Koran recognizes individual and public liberty, secures the person and property 
of the subjects, and fosters the growth of all civic virtues. John Voll also points out other 
Islamic traditions, such as the pledge of allegiance to the leader or separation of the 
domains of the executive and legislative powers in Islam as being another evidence of 
Islam’s compatibility with a democratic form of government.59 Ali Abd Ar-Raziq, an 
Egyptian Islamic scholar who was a supporter and one of the intellectual fathers of 
Islamic secularism, denied the existence of a political order in Islam, which some 
scholars claim was established during the first years of Islam’s emergence. He asserted 
that the Prophet never established a political order because it was not part of his mission 
to found a state.60 On the other hand, whether there was an established political order 
during the years of Prophet Muhammad or not, there is a common perception that the 
greatest periods of Islamic rule have been precisely during that time in which Islam’s 
structural and intellectual developments were the most democratic.61 
Rashid al-Ghannoushi, who is a democratic leader of Tunisia and seeks a 
developed country and society, emphasizes that democracy, popular sovereignty, the role 
of the state which is not something from God but from the people, multiparty elections, 
and constitutional law are all part of an Islamic thinking whose roots and legitimacy are 
found in fresh interpretation or reinterpretation of Islamic sources.62 He asserts that 
democracy is the most effective way to provide a system for avoiding a single individual  
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or class claim of sovereignty.63 Moreover, he defends that “reconciling Islam and 
modernity involves introduction of democracy and freedom, both of which are consistent 
with Islamic principles.”64 
From a different perspective, Ray Takeyh defends the idea that Western 
democracy elevated the freedom and will of individuals above the community’s welfare, 
and, therefore, changed the role of religion from shaping the public order and its values to 
a private guide for individual conscience. He argues that in contrast to this Western 
understanding, Islam, by trying to balance its emphasis on reverence with the popular 
desire for self-expression, will impose certain limits on individual choice.65 However, as 
Rashid al-Ghannoushi emphasizes, the idea of community’s well-being as the ultimate 
purpose can only be achieved by using democracy and freedom of thought. 
Many of the scholars of Islam support the idea that the principle of shura or 
consultative decision-making is the main source of democratic ethics in Islam.66 It is 
stated by God in the Koran that “who obey their Lord, attend to their prayers, and 
conduct their affairs by mutual consent: who bestow in alms part of what We have given 
them and, when oppressed, seek to redress their wrongs.”67 Muhammad Abduh, who is 
regarded as the founder of the Islamic Modernism, equates Islamic shura with 
democracy. Addressing the question of authority, he denies the existence of a theocracy 
in Islam and put forward that the authority of the ruler is civil.68 Actually, in Islam the 
privilege of representation is granted to the entire Muslim community rather than to a 
single individual or to a group.69 According to this information, the selection of the 
representatives has to be based on the free will of the people who are going to be 
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governed by the ruler. In line with this information, Muhammad Abduh defends the idea 
of pluralism and parliamentarianism, rejecting the other scholars’ claims that it would 
undermine the unity of the Muslim community. 
Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad, who was an Egyptian intellectual, focused on two 
concepts of Islam to support its compatibility with democracy. According to him, the first 
is the concept of ijma (consensus) which is the third foundation of Islamic law. 
According to this concept, if the Muslim community “agrees on a particular point of law 
this becomes legally binding on all Muslims.”70 The foundation for the validity of this 
concept can be found in the often-cited hadith of Prophet Muhammad that “My 
community will not agree upon an error.”71 The second concept, according to him, is 
bay’a (pledge of allegiance), a traditional practice of oath with which the caliphs secured 
their subjects allegiance to him. This “was a precedent for democracy since the idea of 
some kind of contract between rulers and ruled could underpin and validate the electoral 
process.”72 
Actually, Islam is a faith, a cultural system, a system of values and ethics, but not 
necessarily a political system by its nature.73 John Esposito and John Voll write that, in 
Islamic history, because there are no explicit formulations of state structure in the Koran, 
the legitimacy of the state depended upon to what extent state organization and power 
reflect the will of the Muslim community.74 It is generally accepted by scholars that 
consensus and consultation are the most important bases for implementing this common 
will in the Muslim community. While God commands people to make their decisions 
with consultation, He does not specify any specific method for this action. Although the 
number, the form of election, the duration of representation, etc., are left to the discretion 
of the people, it is obvious that according to God’s will, one should be surrounded by 
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representative personalities, enjoying the confidence of those whom they represent.75 
Rashid al-Ghannoushi stresses that “Islam did not come with a specific program 
concerning life. It is our duty to formulate this program through interaction between 
Islamic precepts and modernity.”76 While formulating the appropriate program for the 
community, according to Islam, the rulers have to respect the will and rights of the people 
because, during the Judgment-Day, Allah will question individuals but not the 
governments and hold them responsible for their actions. It is stated in the Koran that “it 
is they who will be punished or rewarded accordingly on Judgment Day.”77 
Some Muslim activists reject the compatibility of Islam and democracy and call 
for the application of Islamic law by confusing the boundary between the overall 
sovereignty of God and popular sovereignty.78 On the other hand, David R. Smock states 
that regardless of where sovereignty is placed theoretically, in practice, it is the state that 
exercises the sovereignty, not God. After asserting that the issue is how to limit the de 
facto sovereignty of people Smock emphasizes that democracy, with its principle of 
limited government, public accountability, checks and balances, separation of powers and 
transparency succeeds in limiting human sovereignty.79 It is true that whether it is called 
democracy or caliphate the main problem is finding reliable ways in order to limit the 
authority of the rulers. Moreover even if some Muslims want to call their political 
systems a caliphate, they still have to find institutions in order to implement consultation 
and control the caliph.80 Actually, there is no way of implementing God’s sovereignty 
without having human beings’ participation in governing procedure and without the 
reinterpretation of Koran and sunnah in accordance with the demands of the time. If 
Islam is sound for all the times and places, then one must not neglect historical 
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developments and the interaction of different generations.81 It is obvious that sacred texts 
do not change, but the interpretation of them must be in flux because of the age and the 
changing conditions in which believers live influence the understanding of them.82 
Contrary to some scholars’ view that Islamic law has to be the only source of law 
in a Muslim state, many others argue that it is unlikely to be so in the Middle Eastern 
Arab countries because their legal systems borrow heavily from non-Muslim sources for 
most of their laws, and their courts are generally structured on European civil-law 
models.83 Moreover, in rejection of Islamic law’s political perspective, Bassam Tibi 
argues that the term, Sharia occurs only once in the Koran, in a surah that deals with the 
meaning not of law, but of morality. He claims that neither the term dawla (state) nor the 
term nizam (order) occurs in the Koran.84 In the Koran, the governing systems are all 
evaluated according to their rulers’ obedience of God’s guidance. Christian H. Hoffman 
argues that it can be deducted from these historical evaluations of the Koran that a junta 
and a tyranny are not the systems accepted by God and a monarchy with a just ruler may 
be one acceptable method of government.85 The most important conclusion, based on 
these findings, is that, Islamic law does not entail a specific form of government and it 
allows Muslims to freely choose for themselves and to discover the most suitable form of 
government for their needs. For instance, during the period of the Rightly-Guided 
Caliphs, many administrative and legislative enactments were not derived either directly 
or indirectly from the Koran or sunnah, but from purely commonsense considerations of 
governmental efficiency and public interest.86 
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David R. Smock mentions a precedent from the life of the Prophet Muhammad, 
which is known as the Compact or Constitution of Medina. He claims that this precedent 
shows how democratic practices and theories are compatible with Islamic principles. 
According to his article, after the Prophet’s migration from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD, 
he established the first Islamic state and became the political head of Medina. For ten 
years, the Prophet ruled in accordance with a tripartite agreement that was signed by the 
three different communities of Medina—the indigenous Muslims of Medina, immigrant 
Muslims who came from Mecca, and the Jews of Medina. With this compact Muslim and 
non-Muslims became equal citizens of the Islamic state with similar political rights and 
duties. Besides, different religious communities enjoyed religious autonomy within the 
state of Medina. Smock argues that, actually the Prophet Muhammad could have claimed 
that the truth revealed by God serves as a constitution and could have forced both the 
Muslim and non-Muslim communities to obey it. But contrary to this idea, the Prophet 
chose to draw up a historically specific constitution by seeking the consent of all people 
(including non-Muslims) who would be affected by its implementation. Thus, the first 
Islamic state was based on a social contract which can be considered constitutional in 
character, and its ruler ruled with the explicit written consent of all citizens of the state.87 
Actually, Islam is not a barrier to the foundation of democratic values in Muslim 
communities.  Contrary to the beliefs that support the incompatibility of Islam and 
democracy, Steven Hofmann claims that political matters in Islam are open to 
interpretation, and moreover, the Koran, the sunnah (a set of Muslim customs and rules 
based on the words and acts of Prophet Muhammad), and the hadith (a collection of 
writings that document the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad) may be able 
to serve as a framework for the construction of democracy rather than serving as the basis 
of authoritarian and fundamentalist dogma.88 As proof, one can give the Prophet  
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Muhammad’s hadith that “Differences of opinion within my community is a sign of 
God’s mercy,” which literally describes democratic ideas such as freedom of speech and 
diversity of thought. 
Islamic thought contains concepts comparable to modern Western principles of 
democracy, pluralism, and human rights.89 These principles are not only based on the 
writings of the Koran, but are also derived from the teachings of Prophet Muhammad and 
the era of four Rightly-Guided Caliphs. For instance, Islam supports the idea of social 
equality of the people and suggests that all human beings have to be given the same 
opportunities for development and self-expression.90 Islam also stresses religious 
tolerance which is exemplified in the Koran with “Let there be no compulsion in 
religion.”91 Moreover, there is also nothing in Islamic scripture to deny Muslims’ 
freedom of action to improve their individual and communal lives; nor does Sharia 
promote subservience to the state as proof of proper Muslim behavior.92 
Islamic law is based on the legal decisions that were thought up and evaluated by 
many groups in the first centuries of Islamic history. Esposito and Voll assert that during 
this century, local rulers and judges were called upon to make many decisions within the 
general framework of the developing understanding of Islam.93 This reinterpretation and 
evaluation, according to developing understandings, led to the foundation of different 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence that actually reflect freedom of thought in Islam and 
provides an indication that the Islamic revelation did not mean a single and monolithic 
structure of canon or imperial law.94 In addition, they also examine the idea of dhimmi (a 
form of social contract through which the Muslim community provides hospitality and 
protection to the members of other religions, specifically Christianity and Judaism) in 
                                                 
89 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Religion and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 20, no. 2 (2009): 11. 
90 Muhammad Asad, The Principles of State and Government in Islam. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1961): 20. 
91 Surah 2, Verse 256. 
92 Ali R. Abootalebi, “Islam, Islamist, and Democracy,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 3, no. 1 
(March 1999): 17. 
93 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 44. 
94 Ibid. 
 23 
Islam. They argue that although the concept of dhimmi in the pre-modern history of 
Islam, does not reflect the same understanding of modern democratic concept of minority 
rights, it does have many analogous features and provides a clearer foundation for such 
democratic concepts.95 In addition to these Islamic principles, which provide a positive 
significance for democratization, Esposito and Voll argue that many other traditions, such 
as the right of the Sheikh ul-Islam to issue judgments deposing the sultan for violating the 
basic Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire, can be perceived as an example of democratic 
concepts like constitutional opposition and limiting the government’s power.96 
Nowadays, about half of the world’s Muslims live in democracies, near 
democracies, or in intermittent democracies.97 Overall, forty-three societies can be 
identified in which the majority of their population is Muslim. Among those, twenty-
seven are not part of the Arab world and seven can be classified as liberal democracies.98 
Although this alone may not be a justification for the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy, it is enough to refute the claims of some scholars who argue against their 
compatibility solely because of the lack of democracy in Muslim communities. Simply 
because nondemocratic regimes are in place in a number of countries in the Muslim 
world, does not mean that the vast majority of these countries’ citizens are unsupportive 
of a democratic alternative, which is another implication of scholars who label Islam as 
anti-democratic.99 Whether the word “democracy” is used or not almost all Muslims 
today see it as one of the universal conditions of the modern world.100 Besides, Steven R. 
Hofmann justifies this view, in his empirical research, in both Christian and Muslim 
                                                 
95 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 47. 
96 Ibid., 51. 
97 Alfred C. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the “Twin Tolerations,”” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 
(October, 2000): 48. (Also see Appendix) 
98 Michael Minkenberg, “Democracy and Religion: Theoretical and Empirical Observations on the Relationship 
between Christianity, Islam and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33, no. 6 (2007): 902, 
903. (Also see Appendix) 
99 Steven R. Hofmann, “Islam and Democracy: Micro-Level Indications of Compatibility,” Comparative Political 
Studies 37, no. 6 (2004): 672. 
100 John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, “Democratization and Islam,” The Middle East Journal 45, no. 3 
(1991): 440. 
 24 
societies that, according to the results, Muslims tend to evaluate the concept of 
democracy at least as favorably as Christians.101 
Many scholars argue that the interpretation of various empirical findings and 
analyses show that it is not the problematic relationship between religious institutions and 
the state in the Muslim world, or the religion that causes the democracy deficit. On the 
contrary, it is the political and economic factors confirmed in the history of the Middle 
East that cause it. Larry Diamond sees the basic obstacle to democracy in the Middle East 
is not the culture or the religion of Islam, or the society, but rather the regimes themselves 
and the region’s distinctive geopolitics.102 Political scientist Abdul Rashid Moten, while 
trying to explain this democracy deficit in the Muslim world, asserts that: 
The tragedy of democracy is that those who called themselves enlightened 
did not spread the idea of self-government around the world, but instead, 
colonialism and imperialism. Therefore, it is no wonder that the victims of 
this development identify democracy with aggressive behavior.103  
Actually, many of the Islamist movements’ leaders who have spoken out against 
democracy were expressing a defensive behavior against further dependence on the West, 
rather than a wholesale rejection of democracy.104 Ted Jelen and Clyde Wilcox point out 
that the politics of Islam is influenced by the geopolitical forces and by nationalistic and 
anti-colonial sentiments among many political activists. They also claimed that “if Islam 
was the dominant religion in Europe while Catholicism dominated in the Middle East, we 
might instead be pondering the special case of Catholicism instead of Islam.”105 
Hugh Goddard argues that the phrase hakimiyyat Allah (sovereignty of God), 
which does not occur either in the Koran or in hadith, is essentially a reaction to 
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secularism as an ideology,106 and it is understood from the various scholars’ writings that 
many Muslim activists rejection to democracy, such as Sayyid Qutb’s treatment towards 
democracy, was indeed derived from their anti-Western tendencies. For instance, Azam 
S. Tamimi states that Sayyid Qutb’s discourse, like many other Islamist scholars, shows a 
lack of interest in the origin of democracy or its compatibility with Islamic values. 
Furthermore, Tamimi asserts that Qutb’s understanding of democracy was confused with 
the attitudes and policies of Western democracies toward the Arab world and Muslim 
issues.107 
Of course there are different voices rising from the Muslim World. While 
conservative Muslims tend to view the Western world’s advocacy of human rights as a 
modern agenda by which the West hopes to establish its hegemony over the Muslim 
world, many others look to the experience of the secular West as an effort to promote 
their country’s development.108 Many of the followers of Islam, who tended to look at 
democracy from a purely theoretical and ideological perspective, have been able to see 
what democracy provides humanity by switching to the perspective of reality.109 
Neither communist nor secular or Islamic governments of the Middle Eastern 
countries delivered considerable solutions to the social and economic needs of their 
societies. This deficiency caused Muslim intellectuals to start to advocate for democracy 
and human rights.110 An important point about democracy advocacy was made in the 
Cairo Recommendations of May 2003 by the participants of “The Future of the Islamic 
Nation” conference, organized by the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs. According to 
their recommendations, all participating Islamic countries were advised to adhere to true  
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democratic norms—particularly to the free and fair elections—to promote multi-party 
systems and to eliminate any obstacles while providing a suitable environment for the 
rotation of power.111 
Although the debate over the compatibility of Islam and democracy continues 
among the scholars, the human factor of the democracy deficit is explicitly accepted by 
most of them. It is obvious that the popular tendency towards democracy is increasing in 
the Middle East day by day. However, it is almost impossible to understand the reasons 
for the lack of democracy only through examination of religion and theology. 
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III. REASONS FOR THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 
Having examined the various views of many scholars about the compatibility of 
Islam and democracy in the previous chapter, it is now more important to focus on the 
tangible reasons and causes for the democracy deficit in the Middle East beyond 
ideological and theological factors. It is broadly perceived that authoritarianism has been 
the salient feature of Arab governance in the 20th century.112 Despite democratization 
around the globe, Middle Eastern elites have effectively resisted democracy and, more 
importantly, they have masked their authoritarianism with the façade of democratic 
procedures without the substance of democratic rule. This chapter argues, therefore, that 
the real reason for the hindrance of democracy in the Middle Eastern countries is not 
Islam, but the rulers themselves and the implementation of their well-planned methods in 
preventing democratization and its consolidation. 
Marina Ottaway refers to “semi-authoritarianism,” which she defines as a system 
that combines rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, some formal democratic 
institutions, and a limited sphere of civil society with essentially illiberal or authoritarian 
traits.113 Eva Bellin asserts that the prerequisites for democracy, such as a strong civil 
society, a market-driven economy, adequate income, adequate literacy rates, democratic 
neighbors, and a democratic culture are lacking in Middle Eastern countries.114 In 
addition to lacking many of these prerequisites in the region, such tactics as a coercive 
state apparatus, economic concessions that are given to elites and the military, or 
exploitation of an Islamist threat, are followed by regimes in order to keep their 
authoritarian outlook and hinder any democratization attempt. In addition to these factors, 
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while examining Egyptian authoritarianism, Bruce Rutherford summarizes some of the 
factors that ensure the durability of Egyptian authoritarianism as: control over the media, 
domination in political life, suppression of opponents through a vast array of legal and 
extra-legal tools, careful monitoring and manipulation of civil society groups and 
political parties.115 Although these factors are not solely sufficient for preventing 
democratization, the most important and one of the necessary conditions in pursuing 
authoritarianism and hindering democratization is the will and ambition of the 
authoritarian rulers. All of the other factors are derivatives of the ruling regimes’ 
consistent authoritarian will and when some of these factors unite with the will of the 
ruler, they become sufficient, and constitute the ability of Middle Eastern states to hinder 
the transition to democracy. This chapter presents the main arguments about the factors 
of durable authoritarianism, concluding with the statement that no single factor is enough 
for authoritarianism without being enforced with the authoritarian will of the rulers. 
One of the main factors that often impedes democracy in the Middle East is 
state’s repressive and coercive capacity. Eva Bellin expresses this robust coercive 
apparatus as the exceptionalism of the Middle Eastern states. She links the lack or failure 
of popular revolutionary movements in the Middle East to the strength, coherence, and 
effectiveness of the state’s coercive apparatus.116 It is typical, in the Middle East, for 
authority to use its coercive apparatus to ensure the survival of its regime. For example, 
in Egypt, Syria, or Iraq during the Saddam’s regime, the rulers used their countries’ 
police forces and special security organizations to suppress ordinary citizens and their 
political opponents. In addition to preventing people from going to the ballot boxes 
during elections, the ruling elites usually interrogated the people who participated in anti-
government demonstrations and sent them to prison while some of them were dismissed 
from their jobs. The most important institutions that are used and have to be controlled by 
the regimes of the region are generally the military, police, and other security forces. 
Since these institutions provide the hard power to maintain authoritarian outlook, it is 
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vital for the rulers to have a loyal military or security forces to repress the opponents of 
the regime. The rulers follow various tactics to keep their control over these forces. For 
instance, some of the rulers prefer having close ties with the military, while others prefer 
marginalizing the military purposely and substitute it with loyal parallel military forces 
and security agencies. The rulers who prefer having close ties with the military follow 
various ways to do so. Appointing loyalist officers to the strategic positions, frequently 
rotating the head of these forces, rewarding the military with untouched budgets even 
during hard economic times, bestowing them with various privileges, transforming them 
into key economic players and giving them various concessions are only some of the key 
tactics of the regimes to keep them loyal. For instance, in Egypt, Anwar Sadat’s 
economic policies granted significant benefits and opportunities to the military. They 
became one of the major industrial players by being granted the right to manufacture 
military and civilian goods as well.117 Also, in many of the Middle Eastern states, rulers 
prefer assuring the military’s loyalty by making it a kind of family affair in the country. 
For instance, in Jordan and Morocco, the king regularly appoints his male relatives to key 
military posts, while in Syria and Saudi Arabia, an entire branch of military and security 
forces are among the rulers’ family members.118 In light of these tactics, the military, 
circumscribed with many concessions or kinship with the ruling elite, hardly poses any 
challenge to the regime of the main beneficiaries as they are of the authoritarian status 
quo.119 For instance, in Egypt, it was broadly accepted that, because of the military’s 
strong dependence on the regime and status quo for the sake of its economic and material 
interest, it was the most important supporter of the durability of the Egyptian semi-
authoritarian regime. In fact, this notion became self-evident during the Arab Spring in 
2011 when, after the military drew back its support for the Mubarak regime, it took only 
a couple of days for the protestors to topple his regime. 
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In addition to alliances with the security forces, some of the Middle Eastern rulers 
prefer marginalizing the regular military and forming their own loyal security forces to 
protect their regime against its opponents and even against democratization attempts. 
Frequently, these security forces are formed by rulers in accordance with their members’ 
special loyalties to the rulers or regimes. The most important prerequisites for becoming a 
member of these parallel military forces are ethnic, religious, or tribal ties to the rulers of 
the regimes. For instance, in Syria, the senior military officers are appointed according to 
their relations with the Asad family. And in Libya, Qaddafi placed his relatives in top 
military and security positions while maintaining security within his government by 
depending closely on his family members.120 Moreover, many of these regimes form 
well-organized security and intelligence agencies as parallel military units in order to 
preempt any attempt that might challenge their rule and status quo.121 
In addition to the states’ coercive capacities, namely their hard power, these 
authoritarian regimes also rely on soft power, namely economic institutions such as the 
public sector, a system of subsidies, and the bureaucracy, to shape the priorities of their 
citizens by providing them incentives to support the existing order.122 In this regard, 
Michael L. Ross argues in his article that oil/gas/mineral resources, rent from strategic 
transition ways such as the Suez Canal, and international funding for the Middle Eastern 
states help regimes hinder democracy promotion because these factors provide the ability 
for the regimes to sustain their authoritarian behavior.123 He examines the three effects of 
these rents in Middle Eastern countries and sustaining their authoritarian outlook. 
First Ross discusses the “rentier effect,” which means that governments use their 
rent revenues to relieve the social pressures that might lead to demands for greater 
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accountability and democracy.124 These regimes use their wealth to implement low 
taxation on their citizens, which relieves the tax burden on them and thus prevents the 
formation of opposition groups. In the Middle East, many rulers have devoted themselves 
to sustaining their status by providing jobs, subsidies, and social order in return for 
political quiescence.125 For instance, in Egypt, in order to maintain the political status 
quo, the regime needed to regularly distribute state expenditures and privileges toward 
three social groups: the army, the bourgeoisie, and the state-employed middle class.126 
Moreover, in Saudi Arabia and Libya, governments use their oil wealth for patronage 
spending programs, which in turn, dampens the latent pressures for democratization.127  
Marsha P. Posusney expresses the importance of taxation by claiming that “If opposition 
to arbitrary taxation was the engine to democratization in the West, then both patronage 
and the lack of an onerous tax burden on Middle Eastern populations can account for the 
presumed failure of citizens of these countries to seek greater participation in 
government.”128 
Second, Ross discusses the “repression effect,” which means that governments 
use their countries’ wealth to build their internal security organizations for suppressing 
the people’s demand for democracy.129 Moreover, these authoritarian regimes also need 
money to sustain their repressive powers by paying the salaries of their security forces 
regularly, bestowing concessions to them, supplying them with modern arms and so on. It 
is obvious that when the salaries of the military or security forces cannot be paid, and 
when they cannot be supplied with arms and ammunition, the coercive apparatus of the 
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state will be scattered.130 Eva Bellin states that, annually $2 billion of U.S. foreign aid to 
Egypt gave its government the opportunity to access such resources so that even if the 
country was in poor economic condition, the state was still able to hew to conventional 
economic wisdom and give its first priority to paying its military and security forces.131 
Moreover, the defense expenditures of the Middle Eastern Arab countries constitute a big 
percentage of their total economies. For instance, on average, the countries of the Middle 
East and North Africa spent 6.7 percent of their GNP on defense expenditures in the year 
2000, compared to a global average of 3.8 percent, and 2.2 percent in NATO 
countries.132 Moreover, the group consisting of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Israel, the 
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Algeria purchased 40 percent of global arm sales in 
the same year.133 
And, lastly, Michael L. Ross mentions oil’s “modernization effect.” According to 
him, this wealth in rentier states makes people less eager to work relative to other 
countries. Hence, the failure of the population to move into industrial and service jobs 
renders them less likely to push for democracy.134 Moreover, this modernization effect 
also prevents the emergence of a tangible middle-class in a society that is broadly 
accepted to be one of the main leading groups in the democratization history of Europe. 
In addition to Ross’s arguments, scholars generally accept that rent revenues 
support regimes’ claims to legitimacy. The most important part of their legitimation is the 
material legitimation that is closely linked to the rent incomes of the states. For example, 
Thomas Richter specifies the ways of material legitimization in Egypt as (1) informal 
legislation that grants military influence on economic affairs and gives privileged access 
to material resources; (2) business and trade opportunities that grant business elites access  
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to monopolistic structures; (3) state employment that offers its employees an intermediate 
level of income and social security; (4) subsidies that provide the basic material needs for 
the population.135 
In addition to the rentier effect, especially during the Cold War, the socialist and 
nationalist policies in the Middle Eastern countries affected the bourgeoisie and hindered 
its emergence, as it might be the most challenging force against authoritarian regimes. 
During the Cold war era, in some Arab countries, such as in Algeria and Egypt, the state 
destroyed the bourgeoisie either because it was foreign and perceived as a colonial 
remnant, or because it was not ready to invest wholeheartedly in the nationalist heavy-
industry projects that the military favored.136 Furthermore, Sandra Halperin asserts that 
the Western strategy of containing Soviet expansionism during the Cold War produced 
and maintained dual economic structures that exclude the mass population from 
economic life; created a narrow range of export goods and few trading partners; caused 
highly unequal land possessions and income distribution in the Middle East,137 which 
actually enabled elites to increase their wealth while limiting access to resources and 
blocking the growth of new classes.138 She further summarizes the Cold War’s deterrent 
effects as it defended traditional class structures, restricted the power of working classes, 
and encouraged the rise of ultra-right, anti-democratic groups, thus consequently 
preventing the emergence and development of conditions that are associated with 
democracy in Europe and elsewhere.139 
On the other hand, particularly after the Cold War, although many of the Middle 
Eastern Arab countries had introduced more liberal economies, the opportunities offered 
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by this liberal economy produced corruption in the Middle East. Many of the Middle 
Eastern regimes undertook economic reforms in response to international pressure, but in 
most cases hurried and corrupt privatization programs transferred control over major 
economic assets from government officials to the same people as private 
entrepreneurs.140 For instance, in Egypt, during Anwar Sadat’s presidency, privatization 
often transferred assets or control of these assets to the actors and groups close to the 
state.141 For this reason, although liberalization of the economy recreated the middle 
class and bourgeoisie, their existence did not pose a threat to the regime because of their 
relationship with the government based on mutual interests. 
Constitutional powers that are granted to rulers are also a big factor affecting the 
emergence of democratization. For example, Hamdy A. Hassan asserts that the Egyptian 
constitution consolidates the president’s powers and, as the head of the executive branch, 
gives him enormous authority. According to Hassan, the president’s authority is linked to 
the legislative power by giving the president the direct authority to issue decrees and 
resolutions. Furthermore, the president is the head of his political party, which facilitates 
his legislative authority indirectly. This means that the Assembly, despite its enormous 
constitutional powers, is a mere rubber stamp in the hands of the president.142 
Furthermore, martial or emergency laws, which were and are in effect in many 
Middle Eastern countries, are another source and tool of the regime’s authoritarianism. 
Hamdy A. Hassan argues that the Egyptian security forces performed their task of 
protecting the regime under the rule of emergency laws. According to Hassan, although 
these emergency laws were constituted to counter terrorist activities in Egypt, it was not 
restricted to quelling militant groups, but extended to include the suppression of any 
peaceful protests organized by various political and social actors.143 For instance, under 
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the banner of combating terrorism, the Egyptian president and executive branch were 
given the right to refer civilians to military courts, which were used as a tool to weaken 
the civilian jurisdiction’s authority that started to challenge the regime’s authority.144 
Especially after the end of Cold War, Middle Eastern regimes started to realize 
that the legitimation of their rule was no longer going to be the Cold War games. Instead, 
they figured out that they needed to introduce elections in their countries as a “survival 
strategy”145 in order to find a new source of legitimation. Lisa Blaydes argues that the 
notion of elections in the Middle East provides two important ways for rulers to sustain 
their political, social and economic supremacy. First, with the introduction of elections, 
authoritarians reaped the benefits associated with liberalization—such as foreign aid, 
international political support, trading agreements and so on. Second, with elections, the 
rulers became capable of managing the domestic political elites upon whom they rely for 
the regime’s stability.146 They use elections as a tool for distributing power, rents, 
promotions, and access to state resources among the elites. In order to stay in power, the 
rulers also introduced various tactics to manipulate these elections. For instance, in 
Egypt, the government controlled various dimensions of elections in the country. With 
the help of its constitution and electoral law, Bruce Rutherford states that, Egyptian 
government determined who may register to vote, defined the nature of the electoral 
campaign including which candidates may participate, the amount of money they may 
spend, the size or frequency of their rallies, and their degree of access to the media.  They 
also controlled the polling process, including who may have access to the polls, who 
counts the votes, how the results are announced, and how the electoral outcome is 
translated into political power.147 In addition to these methods, when the elections were 
supervised by the judiciary, as happened in Egypt during 2000 parliamentary elections, 
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the regime employed different tactics, such as preventing voters from getting to the polls 
by using soldiers or government-sponsored thugs.148 In short, by setting up unfair 
competition between regimes’ and opposition candidates, most of the existing Middle 
Eastern Arab regimes use manipulated elections as a “safety valve” for regulating social 
discontent and confining the opposition while reinforcing and prolonging their autocratic 
rule.149 
Especially with the help of the regimes’ monopolies over the media (although 
nowadays it is getting harder and harder with the spread of mass communication devices) 
they are able to easily manipulate public opinion. Incumbent regimes use state-controlled 
television and radio to ensure ample and sympathetic coverage of the government’s 
activities, which are reflected to the population as very favorable for them.150 Moreover, 
Middle Eastern governments monopolized the production and distribution of information 
through censorship, ownership, licensure, national federations, and other mechanisms 
designed to limit political and intellectual activism.151 For instance, Eberhard Kienle 
asserts that during the election campaigns in Egypt, news bulletins on state-controlled 
television left Egyptians with the impression that the National Democratic Party (NDP) 
was the only party running for election because opposition parties were granted only a 
few short slots for their campaign statements.152 Moreover, the governments in Algeria 
and Tunisia relieved some of the pressure on dissemination of information and censorship 
during their introduction of “controlled” liberalization153 in order to attract the Western 
world, after the collapse of Soviet Russia, without letting the media pose any threat to 
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their authority and status-quos. In addition to the manipulation of media by laws, the 
Middle Eastern Arab regimes intimidate, sue, or even arrest editors and reporters they see 
as enemies of their authority, while they woo those perceived as supporters of their 
regimes by establishing close relations that enhance these journalists’ importance.154  
Apart from election fraud and other political manipulation tactics, the real basis of 
state power in Middle Eastern Arab countries is derived from the informal and un-
institutional personal, family and group ties that help sustain the executive power of the 
ruling elites.155 Political introduction of tribes, ethnicity, regionalism, kinship and 
sectarianism to the electoral process affected the natural growth of other kinds of 
associations that are vital for healthy democratization and encouraged the process of 
fragmentation in Arab societies.156 The political process in the region was corrupted by 
the regimes by putting personal allegiance to the rulers at the forefront of prerequisites 
for ascendance in the political and social arenas. Thus, institutional regulations and 
political competitiveness diminished considerably in these countries.157 In addition, 
ethnic divisions in society also pose a barrier to democratization in several Arab countries 
such as Jordan, where sectarian divisions in society are reflected in mal-apportioned 
electoral districts that weaken the legitimacy of the legislature itself.158 
Iliya Harik argues that in the Arab world, authoritarian relations first prevail in 
family relations, then in one’s religious community and finally within the people’s social 
relations. While linking this authoritarian outlook of the states to this authoritarian form 
of civil society, she further elaborates that in many Arab countries, the governments’ 
primary responsibility in education, health, housing, and industrial development is 
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directly related to the large empty space left by the civil society.159 In addition to the 
legacy of these statist ideologies, with the help of rent-fueled opportunities in the region, 
the capacity to build autonomous and countervailing organizations in the society has been 
undermined.160  
The lack of powerful and effective institutions in the Middle East causes a lack of 
horizontal and vertical accountability for the rulers, which in turn leads to durable 
authoritarianism. Eberhard Kienle discusses that although there have been some 
institutional reforms in the Middle East, these reforms have never fostered the emergence 
of autonomous institutions or freed the existing institutions from the central control 
which in turn, might hold regimes accountable for their actions. He claims that the reason 
for this is that democracy promoters insufficiently reinforced these institutions, which are 
supposed to contain and channel action towards democratic outcomes.161 But contrary to 
this notion, in Turkey, the most important characteristic has been the foundation of 
durable institutions that are capable of questioning the government while holding them 
accountable for their policies and their actions. 
For this reason, in the Middle Eastern Arab countries, although their regimes 
introduced some kind of liberal policies in their countries, an insufficient promotion of 
democracy in terms of building autonomous institutions strengthened the hands of 
authoritarian regimes and led to easy manipulation of these institutions. In accordance 
with the manipulation of the institutions, one can cite the intimate relations between some 
civil society groups and the government as an example for the hindrance of 
democratization in the Middle East. Since the hegemony of the ruling parties have never 
been weakened by the introduction of new reforms, they have kept their influence over 
many institutions and civil society organizations by using their legislative and executive 
privileges. Moreover, by using their monopoly on state resources, they easily drew any 
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opposition groups to their side by either penetrating them or directly bringing them under 
government control. For instance, in Algeria, Egypt, and Syria, trade unions became 
partners in single-party regimes by giving up the right to strike in return for special favors 
granted them by the ruling regimes.162  
According to Vickie Langohr, when NGOs and their formations are compared to 
political parties, the limitations on party formation and activity have generally been 
stricter than NGOs, and NGOs have been able to raise money much more easily. She 
claims that these factors have helped to make advocacy NGOs, not parties, the most vocal 
secular oppositions in the Middle East, but since these advocacy NGOs generally 
advocate the interests of a specific group or the importance of a particular principle, they 
are ill-equipped to mobilize a large number of supporters around the ultimate goal of 
regime change.163 In addition, NGOs are also founded and used by Middle Eastern rulers 
to counter the influence of anti-regime NGOs. For instance, the Jordanian royal family 
and the former First Lady, Suzanne Mubarak of Egypt, became prominent NGO figures 
in the region whose actual intent was to gather support among ordinary people for the 
government by using the NGOs as a tool for this purpose. Also, members of Yemen’s 
ruling party founded human rights and elections-monitoring organizations in order to 
compete with those initiated by the opposition.164 
The lack of popular mobilization in the Middle East is also considered another 
factor that strengthens the will and capacity of authoritarian rulers. Iliya Harik writes: 
If there is a single overriding reason why liberalization and 
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of the Arab world, it is that they were introduced at the pleasure of 
governments and for reasons of state, and not because pleasure from civil 
society.165 
Various reasons can be given for this shortage. Eva Bellin refers to the history of the 
region and claims that experiments in political liberalization are historically identified 
with colonial domination rather than the self-determination of the people.166 According 
to her, since the introduction of Western values and the liberalization of Western 
colonialist states were more window-dressing than experiments of self-rule, Western 
countries’ efforts and pressures for democracy promotion cause reactions against foreign 
interference in the region. For example, the family awareness programs which were tried 
to implement by the Middle Eastern governments were perceived by many of the 
population as a Western tactic to contain the numerical strength of Muslims or their 
respective national communities.167 Unquestionably, this notion derives from the 
common history of the colonization of Middle Eastern people by Western countries in the 
past. For this reason, whether Islamists, nationalists, or liberals, political movements in 
the region share the suspicion that the Western attitude toward democracy promotion in 
the Middle East is only a means of achieving hegemonic political ends.168 Consequently, 
Eberhard Kienle expresses the result of this perception, in his article, that even potential 
beneficiaries of the reforms in the region oppose democracy promotion and gather around 
their existing authoritarian rulers against the anticipated foreign interference,169 which, in 
turn, contributes to the consolidation of the state’s authoritarian outlook. 
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Iliya Harik goes further and claims that Arab intellectuals’ ideologies and their 
career considerations caused them to be ambivalent about democracy. According to 
Harik, since these intellectuals were the major allies of socialist and nationalist regimes, 
they asserted that liberalization would widen the gap between classes by working against 
the poor and favoring the rich.170 For these reasons, he asserts that most Arab 
intellectuals remained government employees and did not participate in forming groups 
in which they might freely express their views and challenge the regime’s durable 
authority. Moreover, Arab business elites prefer participating in sectoral groups, such as 
chambers of commerce, rather than political parties, because authoritarian regimes are 
controlling most business opportunities and the formation of political parties, which 
might be perceived as opposition and could jeopardize their access to various economic 
opportunities.171 On the other hand, when these business elites participate in the political 
life of their countries, they prefer making their own deals with no systemic interest in 
reform, while enjoying protection from prosecution for corruption.172 
Another reason for the lack of popular mobilization and the reluctance of 
opposition parties toward democracy in many countries, especially in the secular states, is 
the Islamist threat. In the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East, the failure of 
contemporary ideological regimes to satisfy the needs of their population led to a 
religious revival. They associate the failure of their governments with the failure of 
secularism and of the Western path,173 which in turn led to the ascendance of Islamist 
ideology in the region. But, in fact, before the political and ideological ascendance of 
these Islamist organizations, some of the Middle Eastern regimes tried to use and 
encourage the emergence of various extremist organizations (including the Islamists) 
against the moderate pro-democracy groups. Ellen Lust-Okar explains this tactic by 
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asserting that authoritarian leaders, in order to stay in power, use informal mechanisms, 
such as fragmenting and moderating political opposition groups, or strengthening 
ideologically radical but weaker political opponents to create a threat to the regime’s 
moderate enemies.174 For instance, she asserts that in Morocco the king allowed the 
Islamist movement to grow as an antidote to the leftist and secularist opposition groups. 
While doing this, he sought to keep Islamists strong enough to threaten the left wing 
opposition but weak enough not to challenge his rule.175  
Similar to these tactics, nowadays, while some countries encourage the growth of 
non-Islamist forces as an antidote to the Islamists, for example, others have manipulated 
the constitution and/or electoral systems to prevent institutional growth of Islamist 
forces.176 Due to the manipulation of the constitution and electoral procedures, political 
participation of many of the Islamists were restricted in many countries, whereas in some 
countries they were just not allowed to form political parties. However, this situation 
caused different types of setbacks in the democratization process in the region. For 
instance in Jordan, Yemen and Egypt, independent candidates usually got the majority of 
the non-ruling party seats as independent representatives because they were not allowed 
to form political parties or their parties had been banned by the government. On the other 
hand, this independent candidacy also weakened their oppositional stand against the 
incumbent rulers and strengthened the durability of the existing ruling parties because the 
prevalence of independent candidacy in elections prevented the development of party 
programs that would constitute a clear alternative to the ruling party.177 
Another problem that Islamists’ ascendance causes in the Middle Eastern Arab 
countries is the threat that is perceived by some of the members of the society. Since 
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promoting democracy in these states would lead to an anticipated Islamist ascendance, 
the secular and educated elements of the middle class often unwillingly mobilizes to 
support democratization.178 For instance, in Egypt, Bruce K. Rutherford claims that the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s vagueness regarding their political goals, their lack of clarity on 
basic issues such as regime type and government style produced deep anxiety among 
secular Egyptians, who feared that the Muslim Brotherhood might try to create a strict 
Islamic order after they managed to come to the power. Hence, faced with this prospect, 
many secular Egyptians threw their support behind the regime despite its long history of 
repression179 and tried to expand their own legal space as opposition parties by 
marginalizing the Muslim Brotherhood.180 Actually, this same situation also exists in the 
other Middle Eastern countries who share the same secular, anti-fundamentalist stance 
with Egypt. For instance, the banning of Tunisia’s Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) or 
the preemptive military coup against Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front’s (FIS) victory in 
elections all derived from the vagueness of these Islamist parties’ real intentions and the 
secularists’ anxieties toward them. 
With regard to international support, authoritarian states in the Middle East 
profited from the Cold War by gaining patronage from contemporary great powers in 
return for their reliable alliances in the fight for or against communism.181 The Arab-
Israeli conflict also bolstered the Arab regimes’ political hegemony by legitimizing their 
authoritarianism and providing an excuse for their socioeconomic failures.182 In addition 
to this, the Arab-Israeli conflict also contributed to the reluctance of the region’s people 
toward democracy from another perspective. Even the liberal Arabs perceived the  
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pro-democracy claims of the Unites States as hypocritical, expressing what they see as 
American indifference to the rights of the Palestinians and unconditional support for 
Israel.183  
Even after the end of the Cold War, many of the Middle Eastern states have 
continued to receive Western support due to Western policymakers’ beliefs that stable 
authoritarian regimes would be useful for their national interests, such as assuring regular 
oil/gas supplies and containing the Islamist threat. Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, the 
U.S. government has increasingly believed that if Islamist groups come to power in the 
Middle East, they would pursue a more confrontational policy toward the United States 
and its key national interests in the region would suffer.184 Having known this for many 
years, Middle Eastern Arab regimes have maintained their authoritarian outlook by 
playing on the West’s multiple security concerns and, in doing so, retaining international 
support for their regimes.185 Particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United 
States, the declaration of the War on Terror by President George W. Bush also reinforced 
the position of the authoritarian rulers of the Middle Eastern states and offered a new 
source of legitimization for the regimes’ extralegal practices.186 These regimes have 
harnessed the fear of fundamentalist-inspired terrorism and instability in order to justify 
their one-party rule and relieve external pressure for political reform.187 For instance, the 
Iraq War gave an excuse to regimes such as Egypt to limit the political space more as a 
defensive tactic against terrorist activities. In short, the U.S.’ war on terrorism gave a 
green light to  Middle Eastern regimes to crack down on political opposition movements 
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in the region.188 Moreover, when the domestic perspective of the United States’ 
intervention in the region is considered, for instance, justification of the Iraq War as a 
democratizing mission has discredited many liberal, pro-democracy Arab thinkers in the 
eyes of their own people since people started to view democracy as a code word for 
United States’ regional domination.189 
In addition to the Islamist threat perceived by the West, Western countries also 
feel skeptical about the outcomes of democracy in the Middle East. Nowadays, whether 
Islamist or nationalist the opposition voices arising from the Middle East show that they 
mainly have an anti-Western attitude in their actions and rhetoric. For this reason, for the 
sake of their interests in the region, many Western countries prefer a pro-Western 
authoritarian regime instead of an anti-Western democratic regime. For this purpose, they 
continue supporting and aiding the existing authoritarian regimes, which consolidate 
these regimes’ strength and their ability to maintain an authoritarian apparatus despite 
challenges. Mustapha K. Sayyid comments on this foreign support: “Aware that the big 
global players prefer them (authoritarian rulers) to their Islamist or nationalist 
counterparts and resigned to the democracy discourse emanating from the capitals of the 
United States and Western Europe, they have decided to play the game by pretending to 
introduce reforms while not conceding a single inch of real power to their serious 
rivals.”190 Moreover, Eva Bellin, after mentioning the international support that was 
given to the Mubarak regime, claimed that withdrawal of international aid would trigger 
both an existential and financial crisis, which in turn, would devastate the regime’s 
capacity for authoritarianism.191 In short, the decades-long state-centered policies of 
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Western governments have contributed to stabilizing and fueling the modern patronage of 
the authoritarian and/or semi-authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes.192 
In addition to the United States’ support for authoritarian regimes in the region, its 
aid programs that grant foreign money to many civil society organizations in the Middle 
East are also manipulated by the incumbents. Because of the laws that regulate the 
distribution of this foreign aid and due to the regimes’ attitudes toward the organizations 
that accept foreign money, many civil society organizations abstain from taking it, while 
those that accept foreign grants with the blessing of their ruling regimes become part of 
the patronage system rather than independent representatives of civil society.193 
Although Middle Eastern semi-authoritarian and authoritarian rulers allowed 
some reforms in terms of the liberalization in their countries, they are literally aiming at 
“window dressing” in order to prevent foreign intervention and alleviate domestic 
upheaval. While many authoritarian rulers carry out such liberal reforms to deceive the 
rest of the world, they managed to find different ways to sustain their authoritarian rule. 
Fiscal health, for example, serves the durability of authoritarianism in the Middle Eastern 
Arab states. Whether the money comes from hydrocarbon resources, transit ways or 
foreign aid, it has always been necessary for the regimes’ coercive apparatus. Lack of 
institutions that can hold the regimes accountable for their actions and regimes’ close ties 
with their security forces, whose close relationship with political rulers depends on their 
mutual interests, contribute to the hindrance of democratization in the region. However, 
in Turkey, the foundation of such institutions guarantees the continuity of the rule of law, 
which sets barriers to the excessive use of government’s coercive apparatus, and in 
return, consolidates the Turkish democracy. Moreover, the constitutionalism and its fair 
implementation in Turkey hinders any probable “close” relation between the rulers and 
the security forces, as it is in the Middle Eastern countries.  
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In addition to these tactics, cleverly implementing the policy of “the enemy of my 
enemy is my ally” tactic can also be considered one of the vital policies of the regimes in 
sustaining their power. However, none of these factors are sufficient for the authoritarian 
ruler’s undemocratic strategies. Actually the most important factor and one of the 
necessary conditions for explaining the ability of hindering genuine transitions to 
democracy in Middle Eastern countries is the authoritarian rulers’ ambitions to sustain 
their authoritarian rule despite the pressures of the democracy promoters in and out of 
their countries. When all of the aforementioned factors combine with the ruler’s will of 
repression, then it can cause decades-long authoritarianism, rooted deeply in the region’s 
political and social life.  
One can conclude that, compounded with the states’ social, political, and 
economic conditions, it is the ruling elites’ unwillingness to share their authority that 
stands as the greatest reason for the lack of democratization in the Middle East. Once this 
unwillingness is overcome by ordinary people, whether in peaceful ways or not, the best 
candidate states for reform and democracy will be those that are the most broadly based 
and least sectarian, the most susceptible to the influence of international markets and 
financial institutions, and the least dependent on oil rents for their foreign-exchange 
revenues.194 
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IV. TURKEY’S DEMOCRATIZATION HISTORY 
After expressing the compatibility of Islam and democracy in the second chapter, 
and examining the main tangible reasons for the democracy deficit in the Middle Eastern 
countries in the third, this chapter examines the Turkish example of the democratization 
process, which rises as a unique example among the predominantly Muslim countries. It 
is important for us to examine the Turkish example because among all the modern states 
that emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, only Turkey evolved competitive 
political institutions.195 This supports the argument that the specific example of Turkey 
provides a good example of how democracy can take root and flourish in a predominantly 
Muslim yet secular country.196  The evolution of anti-democratic political powers 
constitutes a good example that is worth emulating by Middle Eastern countries. One can 
assert that in addition to Turkey’s democratic institutions’ effectiveness in protecting the 
democratic form of the state, the inclusion of anti-democratic powers in the political 
arena forced them to moderate their rhetoric and actions in order to gain the support of 
mainstream Turkish voters and to stay in politics. The steps toward democracy in Turkey 
did not start with its foundation in 1923. Actually it has been a long process that emerged 
during the late Ottoman Empire and lasts until the present day. This chapter addresses the 
process of Turkish democratization in three periods, starting with the Ottoman era, and 
continues with the one-party and multi-party era. 
A. OTTOMAN ERA 
Beginning in the nineteenth-century, the Ottoman Empire started to realize its 
power reduction vis-a-vis European countries. This realization was continued with the 
demands to keep up with the modern era. This was a time of closer contact with the West 
through the study of language, in the form of merchants, educators, and increasingly 
military and naval personnel, and the beginnings of a significant Muslim, chiefly 
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Ottoman presence in European countries.197 With these contacts between Western 
society and the Turkish intellectuals and with the spread of higher education and wealth, 
there came to be a large and vocal middle class, important parts of which no longer 
regarded a strong religious identity and a modern way of life as incompatible.198 The 
Ottoman Empire adopted many different measures as it sought to reform and Westernize 
during the 18th and 19th centuries. In order to defend itself from Western imperialism, 
these reforms’ common purpose was to strengthen the state authority and to centralize the 
administration. To arrest the decline of the Empire, the highest priority in reforms was 
given to military reorganization and tax structure.199 In addition to the reforms in the 
military and the economy, which started in the late 18th century and continued until the 
end of the Empire, there had been unprecedented reforms in terms of education, finance, 
law, bureaucracy and many others.200  
The first serious attempts at reforms and closer contacts with Europe started with 
the reign of Sultan Selim III. Beginning in the 18th century, the capitulations, which were 
the political and economic concessions given to some of the European countries, were 
started as tools to intervene in the Empire’s domestic politics. Moreover, inside the 
Empire, the state structure was so highly decentralized that the notables (ayans) in far 
provinces, whom the central government relied on in terms of tax collection and 
supplying troops, were acting as if they were separate entities.201 The Janissary troops 
were so corrupt and worthless that, as Eric Zürcher states, “they were strong enough to 
terrorize the government and population but too weak to defend the Empire against its 
internal and external enemies.”202 In order to overcome these corruptions and decline, 
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Sultan Selim launched the program of reforms called Nizam-i Cedid (New Order) during 
the late 18th century. The main expected outcome of these reforms was to increase the 
palace’s strength against external and internal enemies, to modernize the armed forces, 
and to regulate tax collection by combating corruption. Firstly, he attempted to make the 
existing corps more efficient by reorganizing it. He created a new army that was 
relatively well equipped and trained. He recruited French officers as instructors and 
advisers through the French government. A modern medical service and school were 
established. The Naval engineering school was modernized and an equivalent for the 
army was established. Their students learned French and started to meet with the new 
ideologies that were also affecting the European intelligentsia during that period. These 
cadets who would graduate from these secular and modern schools were going to form 
the backbone of the constitutional movement in the next century. Sultan Selim, for the 
first time, established permanent embassies in Europe. These embassies facilitated 
communication with Europe and emerging ideas started to dispense from the continent to 
the Empire more quickly. These reforms, especially military reforms and the influence of 
Europe, particularly the French, over the Empire alienated the Janissary troops and ulema 
(clergy). Moreover, new taxes, which were introduced in order to finance modernization 
efforts, also infuriated the population. Consequently, on 1807, with the help of the 
Janissary troops’ riot, the Sultan was deposed by the religious decree of Şeyhülislam (the 
head of the clergy) who stated that the Sultan’s reforms were incompatible with Şeriat 
(Islamic law). 
Although the Janissaries and the ulema achieved their goals by deposing their 
reformist Sultan, his successor to the throne, Mahmut II, was also determined to reform 
the Empire. During the early years of his reign, Sultan Mahmut, with the help of a 
prominent ayan, Bayraktar Mustafa Pasha, continued the reforms of Selim III. For this 
purpose, all major ayans of the Empire gathered in Istanbul for a conference to discuss 
the problems of the Empire. In 1808, they agreed on a document called Sened-i İttifak 
(Charter of Alliance), which is considered the first attempt at constitutionalism in the 
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Ottoman Empire.203 With this document, for the first time, the political authority of the 
Sultan was to be shared with the other parties in the Empire. 
Thereafter, he increased his efforts to strengthen the state through military, 
administrative and fiscal reforms.204 In order to centralize the state’s administration, 
Sultan Mahmut abolished the old tax collecting system and tax collectors began to be 
appointed directly by the Porte (the government of the Ottoman Empire). Moreover, to 
strengthen central control over the provinces, he embarked on improving the 
communication system by introducing a new postal system and constructing new roads. 
He abolished the corrupt Janissary troops with its new army called Asakir-i Mansure-i 
Muhammediye (The Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad). He created a new position for 
the head of army, named Serasker, in order to put the entire military under the same 
command. With the abolishment of the Janissary troops, the ulema lost its power, thus 
Sultan Mahmut reduced their influence by putting them into a hierarchical system and 
bringing the holdings of religious foundations under the government’s control. Similar to 
Sultan Selim, this time Sultan Mahmut invited Prussian instructors to train Ottoman 
officers. He also initiated bureaucratic reforms in the Porte. The authority of grand vizier 
was divided among his subordinates so the first ministries in Ottoman history were 
founded. He created an advisory supreme council called Meclis-i Vala-i Ahkam-i Adliye 
to deal with the growing burden of legislation his reforms entailed.205 A translation office 
was founded where many Ottoman statesmen began their careers..206 In addition to these 
reforms, in the civilian education system, for the first time a small group of students was 
sent to Europe for training purposes, which later on contributed to the foundation of 
reformist and constitutionalist intelligentsia in the Empire. 
After the reign of Sultan Mahmut II, on 3 November 1839, Tanzimat fermani 
(Imperial Edict of Reorganization) was announced by Sultan Abdulmecid’s grand vizier 
Mustafa Reşit Pasha as a continuity of the previous reforms. Its basic reforms were the 
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establishment of guarantees for life, honor and property of the sultan’s subjects; the 
construction of fair taxation; introduction of equality before the law for all subjects; and 
limiting the conscription to a maximum four or five years. The expected outcomes of its 
promulgation were to regain the old strength of the Empire by introducing new reforms, 
preventing foreign intervention, stopping the growth of nationalism and separatism 
among minorities, and uniting all non-Muslims with the Empire. Following its 
declaration, non-Muslims were also required to serve in the military as Muslims did 
unless they chose to pay a special tax in order to be exempted from that service. 
Moreover, provincial armies were founded with their own provincial commands and put 
under the same command of Serakser in the capital. During this era, because of the 
introduction of new ministries into the state bureaucracy, the center of power clearly 
shifted from the palace to the bureaucrats of the Porte.207 Although, in accordance with 
the Tanzimat Edict, a new taxation system had been introduced, it was changed to its 
previous form due to the Empire’s inadequate resources and the ayans’ intervention in 
the tax collection system. In 1843, a new penal code was introduced. The death penalty 
for apostasy was abolished, foreigners were allowed to own land in the Empire, and new 
secular courts were established in order to deal with cases involving non-Muslims.208 
Moreover, many new European style secular schools, such as Mektep-i Mülkiye (civil 
service school), were founded and a new secular school system was introduced in 
addition to the existing traditional Islamic schools. 
The Tanzimat edict was followed by the promulgation of Islahat Fermani (The 
Imperial Reform Edict) in 1856, which was actually an affirmation of the previous edict. 
With its declaration, the equality of all religions before law was redefined more precisely 
and discrimination of people according to their religion and ethnicity was prohibited. 
During this era, a new group called the Young Ottomans emerged. This group played a 
major role by supporting the idea of a parliamentary system and opposing the superficial 
imitations of Europe without regard to the traditional Ottoman and Islamic cultures.209 
                                                 
207 Eric J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004): 57. 
208 Ibid., 61 
209 Ibid., 68. 
 54 
Due to the pressures of this emerging group and to prevent Russia’s pan-Slavist 
ambitions in the Balkans, Sultan Abdulhamid II was forced to promulgate the Kanun-i 
Esasi (the Ottoman’s first constitution) on 23 December 1876. Following its declaration, 
the first parliament in the Empire’s history was founded. However, the parliament was 
very short lived. Asserting its defeat in the 1877–78 Ottoman-Russian War, it was 
abolished by the sultan only two years after its foundation. However, during 
Abdulhamid’s reign, many reforms in education and the military continued to take place 
as they were started during the Tanzimat era. As a continuity of the previous era, central 
power was strengthened during this period, especially with the introduction of the 
telegraph and construction of many new railways. Furthermore, tax collection became 
more efficient with the creation of the Public Debt Administration and the rule of law 
started to be implemented more efficiently. On the other hand, censorship that was 
implemented by the sultan in order to silence the opposition lessened the number of 
newspapers and publications. The power that had been in the hands of Porte during the 
Tanzimat era shifted back to the sultan. Although the constitution was not abolished and 
the equality of people was still in effect, Sultan Abdulhamid, contrary to his predecessors, 
emphasized Islam as a uniting sentiment in the Empire because nationalism was starting 
to prevail among the Arab population as well. Since Prussia supported the Sultan’s pan-
Islamist ideas, in accordance with its rivalry with other colonial European countries, 
Prussia’s influence among the Ottoman army also continued to increase.210 
After the dissolution of parliament, a 30-year long despotic regime was pursued 
under Abdulhamid’s rule. On the other hand, as a result of Tanzimat era reforms, which 
caused education to become modernized, secularized and westernized, a new group 
called the “Young Turks” emerged during this period. Their rhetoric influenced the ideas 
of Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which was founded in Paris by an exiled 
patriotic group. The CUP, whose main goal was to reinstate a constitutional system and 
parliament, was taking its power from officers serving in the Ottoman army who were 
also educated in Western style schools with new ideas. With the help of these officers, 
CUP managed to force the sultan to promulgate a new constitution and reinstate 
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parliament in 1908 after a 30-year interval. With this constitutional revolution, the power 
of the Sultan was again taken away and vested in the legislature and the cabinet.211 The 
main policies of CUP reflected the same kind of reforms during the preceding eras. The 
Young Turks were advocating secularist and modernist ideas that disturbed the ulema as 
it had been in the Tanzimat era and even before it. During this second constitutional era, 
CUP embarked on overcoming the problem of corruption and politicization in the army. 
They changed the whole rank promotion system in order to eliminate the uneducated 
officers. They tried to inject a European, particularly Prussian, form to the army.212 They 
changed some articles of the constitution, and by reducing the Sultan’s authority 
decisively, they strengthened the central authority. They secularized the Empire by 
removing Şeyhülislam from the cabinet. Şeriat courts were brought under the control of 
the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Religious Foundations was founded in order to 
control the charitable foundations. The Medreses’ (Theological schools) curriculum was 
changed and modernized. Primary education was made compulsory for girls as well as 
boys. The outbreak of World War I gave Porte the opportunity to abolish the 
capitulations,213 which had been some of the main obstacles against the implementation 
of reforms. In the political arena, many opposition and rivalry parties were allowed to 
emerge.  
In summary, beginning in the late 18th century and until the outbreak of World 
War I, because the palace and Porte saw that the only way to save the Empire was to 
adopt the European style reforms they had pursued these consistently in the Empire. It is 
certain that the constitutional revolution of 1908 modernized the Empire with its society 
more than the previous eras, but the CUP’s secret alliances with the Germans before the 
outbreak of World War I and their significant influence over Ottoman politics would 
cause the end of a more than 600-year-old Empire. Following defeat in the Great War, 
the Ottoman dynasty and prominent members of CUP started to lose power and a new 
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leader, Mustafa Kemal, emerged in Anatolia, who then led the Independence War and 
created modern Turkey from the ashes of an old empire.  
B. ONE PARTY ERA 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who is the founder of the Turkish Republic and earned 
his reputation in the field during the First World War and the Independence War, had 
realized that the Western world had decisively proven itself superior to the Ottoman 
Empire, hence, in order to avoid defeat at the hands of a superior culture, Turkey would 
have to adapt itself to the West.214 Moreover, particularly after the Great War, since 
Middle Eastern countries had lost their independences to Britain and France, and because 
they were incapable of acting independently, there was no use for Turkey to turn its face 
toward them.215  For these reasons, after victory in the Independence War, Atatürk 
started to build a nation-state based on modernization and economic development, for 
which he chose Europe as a model for his country, as the Ottoman Sultans had done 
before him. So in his revolution, he adopted not only the materialism of the West but also 
its ideas, so that Turkish society would be transformed in the broadest sense.216 
According to Richard Robinson, the process of change was slow and faltering 
during the early years of the republic. He describes the step-by-step development of the 
Turkish revolution in four steps.  First, he asserts that, many of the symbols and 
continuity of traditions that had prevented the development of Turkish civilization were 
destroyed by the force of the government, and then law and order were spread in the 
country by establishing a secular judiciary and abolishing Islamic courts. Second, in order 
to have a rapid increase in literacy and national consciousness, education and nationalism 
were promoted. Moreover, education was secularized and aligned with scientific forms as 
in Western countries. Third, the economic development of the country was pursued by 
mobilizing all possible resources in order to industrialize and mechanize production. 
With the emergence of state-sponsored industry, significant numbers of people from rural 
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areas were taken into direct contact with the machine age,217 which in return led to the 
emergence of an intellectual, educated, and proficient work force in the country. And 
lastly, liberal political institutions—such as tolerance of opposition, free press, free 
speech, free and fair elections, peaceful transfer of political power—were established.218 
Many of these steps were taken by Atatürk and his successors in a step-by-step manner. 
Since the early introduction of liberalism and democratization to the society would cause 
these features to be used by anti-system powers to destroy the new republic, total 
democracy was not introduced until the minds of the people matured and a sufficient 
political, educational, and economic level was achieved. 
For Atatürk and his close friends, the state was the principal agency through 
which they sought to build a modern nation, a cohesive citizenry and a strong 
economy.219 To achieve this goal, the most important tool was the Republican People’s 
Party (RPP) which was in power without a considerable challenge to its authority until 
late 1940s. Because the isolation of Turkey from international politics was impossible 
and the gap between the Western countries was so big, Turkey did not have time to go 
through a slow evolution that would stretch out many centuries.220 For this purpose, 
Atatürk formed various reforms in order to catch up with Western countries and achieve 
the level of the contemporary societies of the West.  
Initially, he decided to overcome one of the most important problems in society: 
the interaction of religion and government. Ziya Öniş expresses that: 
There is no way that a liberal democracy can take root in a Muslim society 
without a strong commitment on the part of political elites to the principle 
of a secular political order and firm constitutional safeguards that prevent 
the violation of the secular character of the state.221 
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Because of this, secularism was accepted as the main grounds of the state’s legitimacy 
because it regulates the state’s approach toward different religions and sects and prevents 
the exploitation of people’s religious sentiments.  
For this purpose, after the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, another obstacle 
against the new republic, the Caliphate was also abolished in 1924. According to Mustafa 
Kemal the country would never be free from the old regime unless Islam was neutralized 
politically and the Caliphate functioned in the political arena as a symbol against his 
reforms.222 The phrase that “Islam is the religion of the state” was removed from the 
constitution in 1929. Although the people’s religious feelings were respected, they were 
not permitted to found any ethnic or religion-based political organizations. Furthermore, 
these restrictions were also enforced by constitutional laws. For example, Article 24 of 
the constitution asserted that “education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be 
under state supervision and control,” and “no one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse 
religious systems.”223 Also, through legal and institutional changes, the secular system of 
law and education destroyed the influence and power of the ulema within the state 
administration, put orthodox Islam under state control, and outlawed the use of religious 
speech as propaganda for political purposes.224 By enforcing these secular reforms, 
Atatürk’s aim was to secure the revival of the Islamic faith in individuals’ hearths whose 
religious sentiments had been used habitually as a political instrument by corrupt rulers 
for many years. He also intended to reduce the religion’s effect in public life. For this 
purpose, he passed the “Hat Law” in 1925 and prohibited wearing the fez, which was 
starting to be used by the puritanical minds as a symbol against new reforms and the new 
republic. Furthermore, he outlawed the wearing of veils by government officials in their 
public service and restricted the wearing of religious clothes by religious leaders except 
in their offices. Islamic schools and brotherhoods were closed by the government along 
with the abolition of Şeriat courts in the country. 
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In order to achieve a complete separation of church and state, the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs (DRA) was founded. Although, in some circles it is argued as a 
contradiction to the meaning of separation of church and state, in fact during these times 
it was a necessity for government to take religious education under control. Hakan 
Yılmaz argues that in France, when Catholicism was separated from the state by the 
revolution, it did not fall into a vacuum because there was a well-established social 
institution, the Catholic Church, in existence. On the other hand, in the Islamic world, 
especially in the Ottoman Empire, there was no Church-like social institution.225 Hence 
after the foundation of Turkey and the abolition of the Caliphate, it became necessary for 
the government to build the DRA in order not to let religion drag into vacuum and be 
exploited by others for wrong purposes. Hence, since 1924, the DRA has been in charge 
of religious affairs and the interpretation of Islam in Turkey. It accomplishes its task by 
controlling the content of Friday religious sermons in order to prevent the formation of 
anti-Republican ideas, and by formulating a “modern Islam” in accordance with the 
needs of the state.226 Moreover, the DRA has many other functions, such as controlling 
and administering worship places through its own bureaucracy, controlling and 
administering the study of Qur’an courses, enlightening the public on religious subjects 
by answering their questions, organizing conferences and workshops, and publishing 
religious materials.227 In order to fight against bigotry, the training of religious personnel 
was regulated and taken under the control of the government; religious schools (Imam 
Hatip high schools) were taken under the regulations of the Minister of Education, their 
curriculum was given a secular form, and religious officials were transformed to ordinary 
state employees with regular salaries. 
During the one-party era, another important reform was the introduction of the 
alphabet, which was regulated by philologists according to the roots of the Turkish 
language by the order of Atatürk. By doing so, literacy rates increased very quickly in 
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society. The percentage of the literate population rose from 8 percent in 1928 to over 20 
percent in 1935, and 30 percent at the end of World War II.228 In addition, while the new 
alphabet speeded the learning of language, it also strengthened the link with Western 
cultures, which in return facilitated the modernization process in Turkey. An expanded 
program of technical and increasingly liberal education was established in order to 
challenge the superstition and dogmatic fatalism of village society.229 Atatürk also put 
special emphasis on Turkish women. Even before many of the European countries, he 
granted the right of suffrage to Turkish women in 1930. Many special education 
programs were organized for them while they were encouraged to actively participate in 
every part of the society. Although his ambition was to strengthen the private sector, 
because of the devastating effect of the wars on economy and society, he pursued state- 
sponsored economic activities in order to build the whole country from the beginning. 
The way and the main ideology lying under these reforms can be summarized as the key 
features of the Turkish democratization process.  
1. Key Features of the Turkish Democratization Process 
The key features of Turkish democracy are embraced in the ideology of 
Kemalism/Atatürkism, which finds its meaning in Atatürk’s intent to create a secular 
country out of the heartland of the old Islamic Ottoman Empire. It emerged because the 
revolution had sought an ideology that would guide the people towards modernity and 
win their allegiance so that they would be able to substitute patriotism for religion.230 
Kemalism consists of six principles that were launched by Atatürk in 1931 and 
incorporated into the constitution as a state ideology in 1937. 
a. Republicanism 
Republicanism, which can roughly be perceived as the first step toward 
democracy, means popular sovereignty. It was embodied in the Turkish state system in 
1920 when the National Assembly acquired both the legislative and executive powers in 
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its hands. After abolishing the Sultanate in 1922, a republican form of state was also 
incorporated into the Turkish constitution with its promulgation on 29 October 1923. The 
ideology of Republicanism is the most important guarantee against the sovereignty of a 
person or a group. It is the main ideology behind the foundation of the Turkish state 
system. Because Atatürk had always been an admirer of popular sovereignty in order to 
protect the republican form of the country, he isolated the army from political life. He 
prohibited officers from participating in politics unless they chose to retire. Officers who 
chose not to take off their uniforms were dismissed from the RPP. 
b. Nationalism 
Nationalism is the dominant ideology that generated grounds for uniting 
people under the same flag and led to the foundation of modern Turkey and democracy. 
During the First World War and especially from the onset of the Independence War, 
nationalism as a characteristic of Turkish identity started to become stronger than 
religion. During the Independence War, the nation was believed to be the cause to fight 
for and, if necessary, die for, just as religion had been previously.231 Nationalism, by 
Atatürk’s definition, is inclusive rather than exclusive as it is in the fascist interpretation 
of nationalism based on ethnicity, blood, or birth. According to Ataturk, anyone who 
lived within the borders of the new Turkey, who shared country’s fate and who wanted 
his country to develop, regardless of his religion, could call himself a “Turk.” In order to 
promote this ideology, following the foundation of the new republic, by means of the 
mass media, education, flag saluting, national anthem singing, state parades and non-
religious holidays on national anniversaries, many attempts were made to socialize the 
people into becoming patriotic citizens of a secular republic.232 
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c. Populism 
Populism, which means political ideas and activities that represent 
ordinary people’s needs and wishes rather than a group or family’s, is one of the 
attributes of Kemalism. It embodies the notion of national solidarity by putting the 
interests of the whole nation before the individuals’ or particular groups’ needs.233 It 
denies class structures and rejects any discriminative forms of activity. In accordance 
with this ideology, since democratization also needs economic progress, Atatürk aimed to 
pull the whole nation together by gathering each individual’s efforts. 
d. Etatism 
Etatism emerged as an ideology when the bourgeoisie failed to support the 
economic program of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk by failing to invest in the country’s 
infrastructure.234 In accordance with etatism, the state undertook to build infrastructure 
and industry where private entrepreneurs were too weak to invest and did not find 
profitable in the short term.235 Etatism promoted the reorganization of economy in the 
hands of the state which aimed at providing stability in the economy.  With the 
implementation of this ideology, Atatürk intended to build the whole country from its 
“ashes” by making the state spearhead investments such as building railroads, highways, 
and factories and providing certain services such as banks and so on. Moreover, while the 
state was administering monopolies, in order to promote private investments, money 
loans were given to entrepreneurs and farmers with low interest rates by the banks that 
had been founded with the investment of the state in accordance with etatism. 
Consequently, with the adoption of this ideology, in the 1930s, etatism expanded so much 
that the state became producer, investor, and at the same time, entrepreneur in the 
country.236  
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e. Secularism 
Turkish secularism must be understood as “laicism” which means state’s 
control of the religion rather than a precise separation of religion from the state. Hakan 
Yavuz claims that Turkish secularism seeks to create its own version of “modern Islam” 
to enhance reforms of the nation-state.237  Hence, laicism can be considered a positivist 
state ideology in order to engineer a homogenous and stratified society.238 Being one of 
the most significant principles in Turkey’s democratization process and its constitutional 
theory,239 laicism provides freedom of conscience by preventing the effect of religious 
circles. Susanna Dokupil argues that Atatürk’s aim was to secure the revival of the 
Islamic faith and to disengage it from being a political instrument, and that this could be 
accomplished only in conjunction with secularizing reforms that should penetrate all 
levels of Turkish society.240 Although it is generally perceived that secularism started 
with the foundation of modern Turkey, it actually started to emerge during the Ottoman 
Empire with reforms that had taken place in the 19th century. However, contrary to the 
Ottoman era, secularism in modern day Turkey is explicitly different in terms of the 
religion’s position in the public sphere, in judiciary, and education. In addition to 
laicism’s aim to control religion with state institutions, Atatürk also intended to reduce 
religion to the individual level. By doing so, he achieved the chance to promote 
nationalism and unite people under the same notion of being Turkish citizens instead of 
being pious Muslims. 
f. Reformism 
And lastly, reformism means the continued need for development in every 
sphere of life. It defines the whole reform and revolutionary movement that started after 
the Independence War and promotes a further quest of modernization. It encourages the 
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commitment of the nation to the ongoing change and support for Kemalist reforms.241 It 
constitutes the main ideology behind Atatürk’s main goal to catch up with the 
contemporary, most developed societies. 
C. MULTI PARTY ERA 
Successive governments of Turkey wisely did not attempt to introduce full 
democracy all at once, but instead went through successive phases of 
limited democracy, laying the foundation for further development, and, at 
the same time, encouraging the rise of the civil society.242  
Thus, democracy was gradually established as the cultural level of people became 
adequate to support it in 1945. However, during his life, Atatürk made two attempts to 
achieve a multi-party political system. In 1924, an opposition party called the Progressive 
Republican Party (PRP) was founded. This party was against the economic policies of 
RPP and sought a more decentralized minimal state interventionist economic policy. 
Moreover, PRP was also against the strict secular reforms that had been implemented by 
the authority since its foundation. Only one year after its foundation, following an 
assassination attempt against Atatürk in Izmir, and due to the PRP’s connection with the 
Sheikh Sait Rebellion,243 which was started by Kurdish tribes because of the abolition of 
the Caliphate and Şeriat in 1924, the party was outlawed in 1925. Another multi-party 
attempt took place in 1930. Due to the opposition voices rising from society against the 
RPP’s one party regime, Atatürk himself encouraged the founding of an opposition party 
named the Free Republican Party (FRP). Yet, the FRP was also short lived because of 
exploiting its freedom in an attempt to destroy the whole philosophy of the revolution.244 
Eventually it was dissolved by its founder, Fethi Okyar, who was not able to control his 
party’s activities, especially those targeting the republican order and its reforms. 
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It is broadly accepted that, fundamentally, democracy in Europe has emerged 
from the working classes’ and bourgeoisies’ pressures against ruling authorities. In the 
Middle East, post-World War II and Cold War policies defended traditional class 
structures, restricted the power of working classes, encouraged the rise of ultra-right 
wing, anti-democratic groups and thus prevented the development of the very conditions 
that, in Europe and elsewhere, are associated with democracy.245 On the other hand, 
unlike the Middle Eastern countries in the 20th century, the political, educational, and 
economic reforms that were intensified after the foundation of modern Turkey prevented 
the emergence of these anti-democratic structures. From the beginning of the republic’s 
history, Atatürk always intended to build a strong, democratic, and modern Turkey. All 
of his reforms were geared toward this purpose.  
Michele P. Angrist explains the international influence over Turkey’s 
transformation to pluralism as the Cold War’s effect in its democratization process. 
Especially in the 1940s, Turkey was faced with Russia’s explicit threats toward its own 
lands. According to Angrist, in order to counter this threat and ally with the West against 
Russia Turkey’s RPP leaders allowed political pluralization in the belief that it would 
help Turkey acquire moral and material support from the Western alliance.246 It is true 
that somewhat encouraged by the victory of liberal nations over totalitarian countries, 
Turkish leaders encouraged the formation of opposition parties after World War II.247 
Moreover, taking into consideration the declaration of the Truman Doctrine that promotes 
the idea of supporting the countries against Soviet expansionist policies and the Marshall 
Plan that includes direct American aid to these countries, Turkey made a deliberate 
choice in allying with Western democratic countries against Russia and this policy 
contributed to the foundation of democracy in Turkey, followed by its accession to 
NATO and the European Economic Community during this period. However, these 
factors fall short in explaining the other incentives that stimulate the existing RPP leaders 
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in taking steps toward political pluralism. From the beginning of the foundation of 
Turkey, Atatürk made clear that Western, particularly European, civilization should be 
taken as a model for modernization since their relative supremacy had been proved in the 
last century. For this reason, transition to the multi-party electoral democracy in 1945 
from a benevolent one–party regime was perceived by Atatürk’s successor, İsmet İnönü, 
as an implementation of Atatürk’s populist principles.248 
On the 14 May 1950 election, which Bernard Lewis called an “epoch-making 
election,” the RPP that had enjoyed a monopoly of political power for decades allowed 
itself to lose a free election and submitted itself to the will of its citizens.249 The 
Democrat Party (DP), with the help of its diverse support base, including modern 
entrepreneurs, middle-class artisans, small merchants, and rural migrants to urban 
centers, attended the elections and eventually won overwhelmingly.250 From that moment 
on, Turkey’s political system turned to a competitive electoral democracy which is 
strengthening and gradually maturing each and every day. 
After the DP captured the government, the Turkish economy started to deteriorate 
because of the DP’s poor economic policies. Moreover, party leaders also opposed 
frequent criticism of opposition parties and civil society that they used police and military 
forces to suppress these opposition demonstrations. The head of the DP, Adnan 
Menderes’s measures against the autonomy of the press, opposition, and universities 
proved that he was not committed to a more free and democratic Turkey.251 As the 
economy worsened, DP increased religious activism in order to distract the attention from 
economic failures.252 For instance, during their convention in Konya, a resolution was 
introduced to bring back the fez, restore the veil, return to the Arabic script, and establish 
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the Şeriat.253 Encouraged by related speeches, certain Islamist groups started to destroy 
Atatürk statues because, according to them, making forms of human beings is forbidden 
by Islamic law. These activities caused widespread resentment among secular groups, 
which then led to violent clashes with anti-secularists. Moreover, in 1959 and 1960 
Adnan Menderes himself encouraged violent confrontations between its followers and the 
opposition.254 When police forces proved unable to maintain order, armed forces, on 
May 27, 1960, took control of the government in order to reinstate the stability of the 
country and to preserve democracy by declaring a return to control of the state to civilian 
hands as soon as possible.  
Ultimately, the military adopted an attitude favorable to Islam and recognized 
religion as an integral part of Turkish identity.255 By doing so, they intended to preserve 
the rights of freedom of consciousness and worship while trying to prevent the 
manipulation of people’s religious sentiments, politically. For that purpose they 
introduced a new constitution in 1961 in which they also prohibited politicians and 
political parties from using religion, ethnicity, and sects as a tool for their political 
purposes. With the introduction of new electoral law, a system of proportional 
representation was put into effect, which aimed at preventing mainstream political parties 
from obtaining a decisive parliamentary majority.256 The new constitution transformed 
the Grand National Assembly from a unicameral form to bicameral form making it 
almost impossible to monopolize legislative authority by any power in the government. 
Moreover, with the new constitution a Constitutional Court was founded in order to 
check whether the laws enacted by the legislature were consistent with the constitution. 
This court was also given the right to judge the political parties and if they were found 
guilty of violating the constitutional provisions, it was granted the right to outlaw them. 
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Also, with the establishment of the National Security Council, the military was given a 
constitutional role in protecting the state against its internal and external enemies, while 
they achieved the opportunity to voice its opinions on national security issues as well.257 
After these arrangements, in 1961, the military council left the government to the civilian 
authority as they had promised earlier. 
Turkey witnessed a more democratic environment due to the introduction of a 
more liberal constitution in 1961 by the military council. However this liberal outlook of 
religion and press, in some respect, realized the worst fears of democracy supporters in 
the country. Being affected by the Cold War politics, Turkish society became 
increasingly polarized between extreme right and socialist left. The Justice Party (JP), 
headed by Süleyman Demirel, attacked the RPP not only for anti-religiosity but for 
communist sympathies as well.258 Violent leftist demonstrations on the streets and in 
university campuses took place against capitalism, imperialism and Western influence 
over the country. Moreover, high inflation and, as it had been in 1960, poor economic 
conditions, which deteriorated due to the global recession and 1967 Arab-Israeli war 
caused the situation to worsen. Because of these conditions and the government’s 
incapacity to suppress the violence, military commanders followed a tactical strategy by 
presenting a memorandum to the president demanding the installation of a strong and 
credible government that was capable of fulfilling the required reforms stipulated in the 
constitution. Due to the 12 March 1971 military memorandum, Prime Minister Süleyman 
Demirel resigned259 and a new government was formed, which led to the settling down 
of those violent activities in the country. 
Less than a decade later, after this military memorandum, the ideological divide 
among the population brought a new deep political polarization in Turkish society.260 
The new economic package, the free market system, which the government tried to 
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introduce, was an absolute departure from the previous protectionist system and caused 
resentment among the left and many businessmen. The gradual deterioration of the 
economy, rising inflation, and political polarization led to a mini “civil war” in the 
country. Furthermore, the continuing political stalemate in parliament about the election 
of the new president was also causing tension among society and feeding the violent 
clashes in the country. The National Salvation Party (NSP), which entered successive 
coalition governments since its foundation, was proposing the solution to Turkey’s 
problems as a return to Islam’s teaching.261 Over time, the party became so anti-secular 
that in a mass demonstration in Konya on 6 September 1980, they called for a return to 
Şeriat and refused to sing the Turkish national anthem.262 This explicit Islamist threat 
also contributed to the unrest among secular intelligentsia and military. Despite constant 
warnings from the military, party leaders could not take the violent incidents under 
control, and instead worsened the existing situation by harsh politicking.263 Due to the 
deepening political crisis, worsening economy and growing public pessimism, the 
Turkish military made an official declaration on 12 September 1980 and again took the 
control of the country less than a decade after its previous intervention. 
The leaders of the 1980 intervention restructured the political and social system 
with the new constitution of 1982, which was a kind of reversal of the constitutional 
developments of 1960,264 in order to prevent the reoccurrence of such incidents that had 
caused the chaotic situation of the 1970s. Although the tactics of the military in 
restructuring the order in the country was argued by many circles as being undemocratic, 
with the adoption of the 1982 constitution, the secular features of the country were 
emphasized and specified that this feature cannot be repealed. Moreover, this new 
constitution reiterated the importance of the rule of law and the aforementioned Atatürk’s 
principles. In order to ensure political stability, they introduced a 10 percent threshold for 
political parties to enter parliament. Many of the state officials and especially members of 
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the armed forces, teachers, civil servants and students were barred from becoming 
members of political parties265 in order to prevent political polarization among them. 
Moreover, they promoted religious education in order to teach students basic knowledge 
of Islam and its ethics as well as Atatürk’s principles, particularly secularism. With 
cooperation between the Ministry of Education and the Faculty of Theology at Ankara 
University, compulsory religious education was introduced, which began in the fourth 
grade and continued until the end of high school. The main purpose of these reforms was 
to reduce the chances of exploitation of religion by educating citizens around the country. 
In addition, the government emphasized adult education and opened many adult literacy 
programs on all over the country, which then led to a rapid increase in literacy rates in 
Turkey. 
After the 1980 military intervention, the ideology of NSP was continued in the 
Welfare Party (WP). During the 1990s, under the leadership of its founder Necmettin 
Erbakan, WP undertook serious efforts at grassroots in order to gather support among the 
society and, thus, it reached its pinnacle in the 1994 municipal elections. Afterwards, in 
the 1996 parliamentary elections, Erbakan became prime minister. His party took place in 
a coalition government and accepted the protocol of a free market economy, a tariff union 
with the EU, and international treaties with Israel despite its earlier rejections to them. On 
the other hand, during its governing period, WP chose to turn Turkey’s face more 
towards the East and the Muslim world in order to create the Muslim union that the WP 
had been admiring. Because of the WP’s suggestion of untested but new policies for the 
poor economic conditions and with the expansion of anti-Western sentiment among 
society due to the West’s reluctance towards Muslim massacres in Bosnia, rejection of 
Turkey’s bid to join the EU, mistreatment of Turkish immigrants in Germany,266 and 
growing terrorist activities of the PKK, WP grew in power and in influence among 
society. Although it was gaining support from society, with the expansion of many 
private and free media organizations, the rituals of religious tarikats (religious 
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brotherhoods), the meetings of WP members calling and praying for the rise of the Şeriat, 
the calls for an Islamic state by WP’s local leaders were broadcast to the country.267 
Eventually the military, which perceived these incidents as an explicit threat to the state, 
issued a declaration on 28 February 1997 demanding the government to take measures 
against the rising tide of Islamism. Due to the military’s declaration and wide range of 
protests against the WP from civil society and the political arena, Erbakan was forced to 
resign and his coalition government dissolved. One year later, the Constitutional Court 
outlawed the WP because it was a center for activities incompatible with the articles of 
the constitution on the secular state,268 and party leaders were banned from political 
activity for five years. 
According to Toprak Binnaz, although the military played an important role in 
Erbakan’s fall, there had been many democratic efforts by the civil society, which indeed 
proved the maturity of the Turkish people’s democratic understandings.269 With the 
spread of various communication devices in the country—such as television channels, 
internet, and radio—people easily mobilized against the government and its policies. For 
instance, many women in civil society organizations that felt threatened due to the WP’s 
factious attitude towards Turkish women took an active role in monitoring the actions of 
the WP and organized mass demonstrations, letter writings, and open-discussions against 
the government. Moreover, because of the WP’s policies that divided society along a 
secularist versus Islamist axis and the economic frustration of the citizens, many NGOs, 
labor unions, professional organizations, academicians, and business organizations called 
for Erbakan’s resignation. Thousands of people’s slogans that Turkey will not be 
“another Iran” in the stadium during soccer games, mass protests on the main squares of 
the cities contributed to the fall of the WP.270 Because of these incidents that took place 
in Turkish society, Susanna Dokupil asserts that “in one sense, Erbakan’s peaceful 
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departure suggested that the forces of democracy have strengthened in Turkey.”271 
Actually, this incident is also crucial for the other Middle Eastern countries that are eager 
to use the Turkish democratization experience as a model. Almost fifty years of 
democratic experience of Turkish society showed that the establishment of strong 
democratic institutions, freely organized civil society organizations, free media that can 
disseminate the contemporary news to the people, NGOs such as business organizations 
that are well-integrated into the free market economy and concerned with political 
stability due to its worsening effect on their profit margins, and a tangible protector of the 
state and its democratic and secular outlook are very important for the newly emerging 
democracies. On the other hand, this 1997 “post-modern” coup also proved that it takes 
time for the society and the democratic institutions to become mature and fully capable of 
protecting the system and its democratic outlook. 
After the WP was dissolved, its ideology was pursued by the Virtue Party (VP), 
which was also dissolved by the Constitutional Court because of essentially continuing 
the WP. Thereafter, the movement split into two parties, the Felicity Party (FP) and the 
Justice and Development Party (JDP). The FP took a more moderate stance than its 
predecessors, but however, lost most of its supporters in the 2002 general elections to the 
JDP, which was founded by the reformist young generation within the WP after its 
closure and was declared a moderate, central, and secular party. Actually Mustafa Kemal 
and his successors’ secular ideology defined the boundaries within which all of the 
political parties could operate and thus made a deliberate contribution to the Turkish 
democracy.  Moreover, in light of the past experiences of Turkish political life, Susanna 
Dokupil argues that Islamists who wished to create a serious opposition force in Turkish 
politics realized the need to operate within secular parameters, not only to avoid closure 
by the Constitutional Court but also to attract mainstream Turkish voters.272 Furthermore 
the evolution of perceptions of democracy in Turkey, especially after the 1980s, changed 
                                                 
271 Susanna Dokupil, “The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modern Turkey,” West 
Virginia Law Review (Fall, 2002): 117.  
272 Susanna Dokupil, “The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modern Turkey,” West 
Virginia Law Review (Fall, 2002): 124. Also see: Gunes Tezcur, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of 
Moderation (USA: University of Texas Press, 2010), 306. 
 73 
in the minds of ordinary citizens as well. The adoption of liberal economic policies led to 
the emergence of new business circles that helped strengthen democratic principles and 
their perceptions in the country. Additionally, the introduction of a free market system 
caused the emergence of a rapidly expanding middle class of modern consumers who do 
not appreciate escalating ideological and political confrontations that may endanger their 
welfare.273 
In addition to these factors, the European Union’s effect over Turkey’s 
democratization process cannot be denied. The mass popular support behind Turkey’s 
application for EU membership left many politicians with little choice but to support 
further democratization and modernization in order to fulfill the requirements of 
accession.274 Besides popular support for democratization coincides with the ideal that 
had been directed by Atatürk, which was to achieve the level of “contemporary 
civilizations.” The hope of European Union membership helped provide a common 
project for different elements of the Turkish society, which in return softened the 
fundamental clash between the secular and Islamists groups in Turkey.275 
D. CONCLUSION 
As a good example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, Turkey has done 
well in its democratization process and still continues to consolidate its democracy 
toward liberal concepts. Actually, it has not been easy for a predominantly Muslim 
country to establish democracy and consolidate it. Especially during the Tanzimat era and 
afterwards various new state institutions were founded on the basis of European 
counterparts. However, what hindered the modernization and led to the destruction of the 
Ottoman Empire was the coexistence of new and old institutions in the Empire. But in 
modern Turkey, the same mistakes were not repeated. New institutions replaced the old 
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ones and whole revolution logic was settled on this idea. The Independence War’s effect 
cannot be neglected in the foundation of the Turkish Republic, which gave the country a 
new start to everything. For about twenty-five years, with the reforms accomplished by 
the one-party regime, democracy’s infrastructure was settled and it facilitated 
understanding this new world view by the people. With the spread of education, people 
started to become aware of the world surrounding them and their religion, which made it 
hard to exploit by the politicians for their political purposes. 
The vicissitudes of democracy building under the late Ottomans, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, and his successors would seem to confirm the belief that democracy is a strong 
medicine that must be administered in small and only gradually increased doses.276 In 
accordance with this view, from 1923 to the mid-1940s, democracy was gradually 
established by the RPP by implementing various reforms and also putting some 
restrictions over the society. From the mid-1940s to the present day, as democracy was 
being consolidated, many of these restrictions were lifted and a wide range of different 
political views became increasingly incorporated into the political system, being 
moderated by the state’s bureaucracy and democratic institutions such as civil society, 
judiciary, NGOs, etc. Toprak Binnaz writes that “a democratic environment provides a 
platform for the organization of anti-system parties while it forces them to limit their 
sphere of action and to moderate their ideology.”277 
It is true that, as Ziya Öniş expresses, a representative democracy in Turkey 
caused anti-democratic powers to experience a long learning process. He further argues 
that the democratic order has helped to shape the demands of them in a more moderate 
direction, as they realized that compromise solutions were vital for their effectiveness and 
survival within the boundaries of a secular state.278 On the other hand, the political 
participation of these moderate political views also contributed another dimension to 
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Turkish democracy. By giving various political groups an organizational space and 
participation opportunity in the democratic process, governments started to realize the 
religious sensibilities of the voters more broadly.279 In short, Turkey’s democratization 
history shows a path for moderating the undemocratic groups, especially the non-violent 
ones, in terms of making them adopt the vital features of democracy, which in turn, lead 
to the moderation of the whole political sphere in the country. 
It is obvious that in a democratically naive country, in order to protect the regime 
against its enemies, there has to be pro-democratic powerful institutions as a prerequisite 
for consolidation of democracy. Although the military is perceived as the defender of 
Turkish democracy and its secular ideology, more importantly, the democratic 
institutions such as the judiciary, rule of law, civil society, free media and press played a 
major role in drawing the “red lines” for anti-democratic players. 
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V. TURKEY’S DEMOCRATIZATION AS AN INSPIRATION FOR 
THE MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES 
The suggestion of Turkey as a model for democratization first emerged after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. Especially in the early years of 
the 1990s, the Turkish model became popular among Western countries, particularly the 
U.S., which regarded it as an ideal model for the Muslim republics that formed after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.280 Because of Turkey’s being a secular and democratic 
state, having experienced a successful economic transformation since the 1980s, and 
sharing the common culture with these Turkic states,281 to many in the Western world, 
Turkey seemed like the natural model of state building and democratization for these 
newly independent Central Asian countries. Moreover, the Western countries assumed 
that, after its collapse in 1991, Russia would be vacating the area, thus a power vacuum 
would emerge in Central Asia that might be filled with an anti-Western, revolutionary 
kind of Iranian Islam that would endanger the Western countries’ position in the region 
and harm their interests if nothing was done.282 For this purpose, many Western 
countries’ leaders started to present Turkey as a model that offered an alternative to a 
feared rise in fundamentalist, anti-Western Iranian influence in the region and counters to 
the residual Russian influence over Central Asian countries.283 
About a decade later, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, President 
George W. Bush and his officials again started to promote the Turkish example in their 
fight against terrorism and the destruction of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East 
and Afghanistan. This moment in the world’s history led to the reemergence of such 
claims about Turkey as a potential model for the project of democratization in the Islamic 
world. The top officials and politicians of the West, particularly the American officials, 
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emphasized the example of Turkey in their democracy promotion program for Middle 
Eastern countries. They pointed out Turkey where they saw a successful coherence of 
Islam and democracy as a model for these countries. For example, in 2002 Deputy 
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz referred to Turkey as a model for those in the Muslim 
world who have aspirations for democratic progress, while President George W. Bush 
himself suggested that Turkey provided Muslims around the world with a hopeful model 
of a modern and secular democracy.284 With the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
the idea of democracy formation in the Middle East was also reflected in the actions of 
Western countries, which then led to the adoption of the Broader Middle East and North 
Africa Initiative in the G-8 Summit of June 2004. This consensus among the world’s 
major countries revealed that the major extra-regional actors were willing to collectively 
push for political and economic reform in the Middle East.285 With the involvement of 
many countries other than the United States in a democracy promotion process in the 
Middle East, Turkey being an example for these Muslim countries got more attention 
among social scientists all around the world. 
The debate over the Turkish model diminished in the second half of the 2000s. 
Still, beginning in 2010, the emergence of popular riots in Tunisia which triggered the 
other popular uprisings called the “Arab Spring” against the region’s authoritarian leaders 
have started  debates about the future direction of the political structure of these 
countries. The possibility of relatively strong fundamentalist Islamist parties coming to 
power after deposing the existing pro-Western, secular, and authoritarian leaders has led 
to the reassessment of diverse democratization paths among not only Middle Eastern but 
also Western countries. In light of these historic incidents occurring in the region, 
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of what it is—a nation of mainly Islamic faith that is secular, democratic, and 
modernizing,286 Turkey again became the subject of debate as a role model for Middle 
Eastern countries. 
Before examining the Turkish model’s applicability to the region, the notion of 
“model” has to be clarified. It would be wrong to call a model a precise blueprint that 
should be replicated literally. A more realistic understanding of model should consider it 
as a guide that offers relevant lessons from its past political, social and economic 
experiences and draws a practical framework for the other countries that are seeking to 
progress their own political, social, and economic structure by emulating this guide.287 
So it is more appropriate to approach the concept of model from this perspective while 
not ignoring that every country is a sui generis. For this purpose, when one calls Turkey a 
model, it has to be understood as a Western style inspiration based on democratization, 
secularization and modernization, which may lead to the institutionalization and then 
moderation of the political circles. 
Having given the history of Turkish democratization and its key features in this 
process it is important to state that Turkey, where democracy has successfully emerged 
within the context of secularism in a predominantly Muslim country, has provided a 
successful example for many leaders that seek to develop a democratic system in their 
own countries. For instance when Pakistani leader General Pervez Musharraf broke with 
Islamic fundamentalists and outlined a secular feature for Pakistan, he was following an 
example he studied closely while he was  a young officer in a Turkish military school—
that of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.288 In addition to Pervez Musharraf, there are also other 
leaders who emulated or tried to emulate Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his reforms while 
forming their countries. For example Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Reza Shah Pahlavi of 
Iran, and King Amanullah of Afghanistan all followed Atatürk’s programs of 
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modernization289 although they could not establish as successfully a modernized and 
democratized society as Atatürk had done in Turkey. 
Henri J. Barkey emphasizes the significance of Turkey as an important link 
between West and East by putting forward its historical achievements in making itself as 
a bridge from an empire to a nation state, from theocracy to a secular state, and a system 
of economic backwardness to relative modernization.290 Actually, Turkey, by sharing 
democratic systems with the West and religion with the East, truly became an example 
for the Muslim world by being one of the few predominantly Muslim states in which 
representative and democratic politics emerged.291 Apart from possessing a modern 
democratic, secular political structure, successful economic modernization, significant 
improvement of relations with the EU and its parallel reforms process, the evolution of 
Turkey’s political Islamist movement has also increased the interests in Turkey and made 
it relevant to the debates in the Middle East.292 
In addition to Western views about Turkish democracy and its applicability to 
other Muslim countries, there is also an ascending sympathy towards the Turkish model 
and Turkey on the Middle East streets. Although it has been diminishing nowadays, until 
the beginning of the 21st century, most of the Middle Eastern Arab people had unpleasant 
views about the Turkish democracy and Turkey. Ömer Taşpınar asserts that “where 
Americans see Turkey as the only Muslim, democratic, secular and pro-Western country 
in the Middle East, Arab countries see a former colonial master that turned its back on 
Islam.”293 In addition to seeing Turkey as an imperial master, many Arabs have 
considered Turkish secularism as an imposition by a small elite on a population that 
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continued to remain Islamic.294 Moreover and most importantly, deriving from their 
resentments towards their corrupt, unsuccessful secular leaders and governments, many 
Arabs have perceived secularization as an oppressive and superficial idea that seeks to 
impose Western dress, lifestyle and symbols on their Muslim community.295 However, 
nowadays this rhetoric is eroding among the Arab population in the Middle East. With 
the spread of mass communication devices, the Arab streets are becoming more 
intellectual and open to the new ideas that have been changing the outlook of many other 
countries on the world.  
According to the TESEV’s (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) 
survey that was done among seven Arab countries296 and Iran in 2010, 66 percent of the 
respondents expressed Turkey as a model for the Middle Eastern Muslim countries. 
Contrary to earlier views of Turkish democracy and secularism, 66 percent of the 
respondents also thought that Turkey represented a successful blend of Islam and 
democracy. When respondents were asked the reason for seeing Turkey as a model for 
their countries, TESEV concluded that Turkey’s Muslim background, economic power 
and democratic regime were the most popular answers. However, when the respondents 
who opposed the idea of taking the Turkish example as a model for their countries were 
asked the reason behind their negative thoughts, Turkey’s being a secular country and not 
being Muslim enough were the first two most common answers.297 It can be deduced 
from this recent survey that there is an ascendance among the positive views about 
democracy and following the Turkish model to achieve it. On the other hand, there are 
still resentments towards secularism in these Middle Eastern countries, which were most 
importantly deriving from their past experiences with their authoritarian leaders. 
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Among the political scientists, there exists a divide about the possibility of 
Turkish democracy being a model for Middle Eastern countries. While some of them 
support the uniqueness of the Turkish example, some of them assert that the Turkish 
steps toward democracy can be emulated by Middle Eastern Muslim countries. Aswini K. 
Mohapatra, who defends the uniqueness of Turkey’s democratization, claims that what 
makes the Turkish experience unique is a combination of historical and structural factors 
such as the absence of landed class and formal colonialism, early consolidation of state 
power, establishment of popular legitimacy, close links with the West and the 
development of modern social groups as a result of institutional separation of state from 
economy.298 She asserts that there was no strong landed class in Anatolia. But in the 
Middle East, for example in Iraq, nearly 60 percent of the land was owned by 2 percent 
of the total number of landholders until the mid-1950s. Similarly, in Syria 2.5 percent of 
the total landowners held about 45 percent of irrigated and 25 percent of rain-fed land.299 
It is true that after World War I and until their individual independences, the colonial 
countries in the Middle Eastern Arab states found it easier and more effective to govern 
them by only controlling the elite, which usually consisted of those landholders. Without 
introducing a substance of democratic rule, even after the independence of these Middle 
Eastern Arab countries, the colonial states left the authority to those elites who had stayed 
as their loyal allies for many years. These tribal chieftains, upper landed classes, and 
urban-based notables held control of their countries until they faced a coup from the 
patriotic military officers as happened in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. However, the revolutions 
implemented by these new leaders of the Middle East, apart from undertaking agrarian 
transformation and state-led industrialization, destroyed the power of the notables with 
land reforms, and replaced them with the state itself,300 which in turn demolished the 
emergence of the middle-class and bourgeoisie that are typically the most important 
advocates for democratization. 
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But, in Turkey, as the previous chapter has discussed, the implementation of 
etatism caused state-led economic transformations. Besides, the successful 
implementation of incentives for private investments in the country can be considered as 
a difference from the Middle Eastern countries’ experiences. It is also true that the lack of 
colonial experience in Turkey caused easy and quick adoption of Western values. 
Because of this lack of colonial culture in Turkish history, Turkey inherited a strong state 
structure from its predecessor, namely the Ottoman Empire. But on the other hand it 
cannot be denied that after two devastating wars, World War I and the War of 
Independence, the educated population of Turkey was so diminished that it was 
impossible to find enough teachers around the country. For this reason, Turkey’s 
inheritance of a state tradition could have been considered a unique condition. But when 
one takes into account the more than a half-century long independent governance period 
of the Middle Eastern countries, it may be wrong to defend Turkey’s unique inheritance 
of state tradition as an obstacle to its being a model for the Middle Eastern Arab countries 
instead of examining the tangible factors that have hindered the formation of powerful 
state tradition in those countries. 
In addition to the inheritance of imperial state tradition, Ömer Taşpınar brings up 
the unique role of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his gradual approach to democratization as 
distinctive characteristics of Turkey’s democratization process. He claims the lack of 
these factors in Middle Eastern countries as a big gap of applicability of Turkish model to 
them.301 It is true that there was only one Atatürk but there were also Habib Bourguiba, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser and many other prominent leaders in Middle Eastern countries who 
had the chance to change the fate of their countries in the past. Because these leaders 
proved their incapacity to transform their countries into prosperous democratic ones, 
now, in 2011, the Arab people are in the streets protesting their incumbent leaders and 
calling for democracy. For this reason, although it is impossible to find an Atatürk in  
 
 
                                                 
301 Ömer Taşpınar, “The Turkish Model: How Applicable.” TASSA Annual Conference Proceedings, March 25-
26, 2006: 36. http://www.tassausa.org/docs/TASSA2006CProceedings.pdf 
 84 
each Middle Eastern country, it is possible to find determined, charismatic, influential 
leaders in those countries who are capable of pursuing the democratization process in the 
foreseeable future. 
Meliha Altunışık states that the argument for the lack of a secular and liberal 
experience in the Middle East is historically wrong. According to her, most of the Middle 
Eastern Arab countries were part of the Ottoman Empire while it was implementing 
reforms in order to modernize the empire. Therefore, they were also influenced by this 
modernization and secularization process with Turkish society in Anatolia. Moreover, she 
points out that, during the colonial era and post-independence period, secularism was the 
foremost characteristic of most of the Middle Eastern Arab countries’ state formations 
like Iraq, Syria, Iran and Egypt.302 So, it is not right to associate secularism and 
modernization reforms only with Turkish history and to consider it a unique condition 
peculiar to Turkey. Although Middle Eastern countries also experienced these features, 
because of the incapacity of authoritarian secular regimes to transform themselves 
through political and economic reforms, and suppression of the emerging Islamist 
opposition groups, secularism is generally associated with dictatorship, the violation of 
human rights, and the abrogation of civil liberties.303 
Another factor that is debated among scholars as a unique factor in Turkey’s 
democratization is the Western countries’ and organizations’ influence over this process. 
One cannot deny the Cold War politics’ effect over the course of the Turkish political 
system. Moreover, as was examined in the previous chapter, Turkey’s international 
position as a bulwark against Soviet influence also facilitated the consolidation of its 
economic and political development.304 Turkey’s institutional relations with the West 
through NATO, the Council of Europe, OECD, and the EU, and its bilateral relations 
with Washington and European capitals also have contributed to its democratic 
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outcome.305 On the other hand, especially after the Iraq War, a direct involvement of 
Western countries in the Middle East is likely to bring resentment and radicalism, rather 
than democratic change and moderation to the region.306 However, in Turkey, foreign 
involvement also caused resentment among the Turkish population, which contributed to 
the occurrence of chaotic situations that ended with military interventions. Besides, it is 
not a prerequisite to have direct foreign involvement in a democratization process. It is 
more important to provide incentives and compelling factors for Middle Eastern countries 
by the Western world as occurred in the Turkey’s democratization process. For these 
reasons, it is not an exclusive factor that Turkey was stimulated by foreign countries and 
this notion cannot be replicated by Western countries in the Middle East. Actually the 
United States’ and European Union’s aid programs in democracy promotion in the 
Middle East and its recent consequences prove the applicability of this foreign 
involvement that causes gradual enlightenment of the society by strengthening the civil 
society and social media. 
Scholars approach the Turkish democratization example with its applicability to 
the Middle Eastern Arab countries from two perspectives. The scholars who focus on the 
evolution of political Islam in Turkey assert that this experiment proves the compatibility 
of Islam and democracy with the attainability of moderate Islamism.307 Actually, this 
evolution of Islamism is one of the most important theses of the Western countries who 
fight against Islamic fundamentalism all over the world. Other scholars who approach 
from a more general perspective emphasize the whole democratization process without 
limiting it to only the moderation of political Islam. They see Turkey as a democratic and 
secular country that is not only economically coherent with globalization, but also a 
member of various Western international organizations as a predominantly Muslim 
country.308 By doing so, when it is approached from a broader perspective, the attraction 
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of the Turkish model is not limited to the moderation of political Islam rather it is 
widened to the foundation of democratic institutions and modernization projects in 
Turkey. 
It is true that today, as Graham Fuller states, grievances, anger, and opposition are 
reflected in the rhetoric and expressions of Islamism in the Middle East. This notion is 
not because the people are certain that Islamism would provide the absolute solutions to 
the problems of their societies. Other than Islamism, the frustration of the Middle Eastern 
societies also found its rhetoric in other ideologies such as Arab nationalism, and 
Marxist-Leninism in the past.309 Because of the Islamic fundamentalists’ violent 
revolutionary actions and their terrorist campaigns, many of the Islamist organizations, 
whether moderate or not, were suppressed in the Middle East, which in turn caused them 
to go underground, not participate in political life, and resort to radicalism and terrorism 
against the rulers and their own populations. However, in Turkey since the beginning of 
the multi-party regime, various opposition groups were allowed to participate in politics. 
Since its foundation, Turkey has made significant progress in reconciling Islam with 
modernity and democracy, which made Turkey, in the eyes of not only the Western 
countries, but also in the Muslim world, a model for moderating political Islam through 
democracy.310 By accommodating rather than suppressing political Islam in Turkey, 
Islamists naturally evolved in a moderate direction. This made Turkey an important 
precedent for the Middle Eastern Arab countries.311 Actually, the moderation of Christian 
Democracy in Europe also occurred in a similar way. The imperative form of competition 
in democracies transformed the Christian Democrats into a more moderate character.312 
Similar to Christian Democracy and the Turkish example, Muslim democracy is also 
going to be moderated in this competition environment because the people in the Middle 
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East will realize that the ideology of Islamism per se is incapable of providing tangible 
solutions to social grievances and so, as happened with Marxist-Leninism or Arab 
nationalism in the past, their influence in society would end like its predecessors’. 
Therefore, they will be forced to moderate their views and rhetoric in order to be 
accepted as a legitimate representative of the voters in a democratic environment. 
Similar to those views, as a key step toward the moderation of political Islam, 
Amr Hamzawy asserts that, as happened in Turkey’s democratization history, the 
Islamists’ inclusion in the political arena would lead them to face the real challenges of 
managing contemporary societies and would give them the space to experiment in public 
with a range of moderate views on socio-cultural issues.313 Actually, it is true that the 
suppression of Islamist organizations makes them more popular among society in the 
Middle East during the electoral campaigns. For instance, Kurzman and Naqvil assert that 
according to the World Values Survey, support for the implementation of Sharia is 
highest in the countries with the lowest levels of political freedom, such as Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia. Whereas by contrast, when Muslims are given the opportunity to vote 
freely for Islamic parties, they have tended not to do so.314 In addition, the evolution of 
Turkey’s political life is becoming more attractive in the Arab streets and among the 
Middle Eastern Islamists. For example, in Tunisia, where a strong and educated middle 
class exists, the Islamist leader Rachid Ghannouchi compares his Islamist movement to 
moderate Turkish examples while rejecting Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution.315 
Furthermore, in Egypt, especially the young members of the Islamist party, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, are much more open to the world and anxious about bringing internal 
reform while being fascinated with the Turkish example.316 
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The Turkish example demonstrates that it is crucial to introduce democracy 
gradually rather than as shock therapy. Because the majority of moderate Islamists in the 
Middle East still continue to hold discriminatory illiberal views about such topics as 
gender equality, the civil and political rights of non-Muslim population groups, religious 
freedom, and the modernization of education systems.317 For this reason, a fast 
introduction of democracy in those countries would cause the elections turn into “one 
man, one vote, one time” scenario elections, which would bring the illiberal Islamists, 
who would most probably use their status and power to destroy democracy itself, to 
power. Algeria’s experience with democratic elections that brought to power Islamic 
fundamentalists and continued with the degeneration of the process into a bloody civil 
war, is the clearest and most tragic example of fundamentalist theocracy coming to power 
through elections based on a “one man, one vote, one time” scenario.318 
After the participation of Islamist parties in the Middle Eastern countries’ politics 
is achieved with the gradual introduction of liberal and democratic practices, the 
challenge will then be to constrain a democratically elected, Islamist-led government with 
effective constitutional checks and balances319 in order to preclude the Islamists 
changing the whole form of the political system and destroying the secular and 
republican form of democracy. In the Turkish example of the democratization process, 
democracy was gradually introduced with many checks and balances. This notion can be 
considered the most important feature of the Turkish model in its democratization process 
and its emulation by the other Middle Eastern Arab countries. It is obvious that in 
Turkey, without the government’s limits on accepted religious teachings and on the 
participation of religious parties in the political process, powerful Islamic fundamentalist 
forces would seek to divert the country from its secular path.320 Similar to this feature, in 
                                                 
317 Amr Hamzawy, “The Key to Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists.” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Policy Brief, no.40 (July 2005): 3. 
318 Ömer Taşpınar, “An Uneven Fit?: The “Turkish Model” and the Arab World.” Project on U.S. Relations with 
the Islamic World, The Brookings Institution (August 2003): 5. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2003/08islamicworld_Taşpınar/Taşpınar20030801.pdf 
319 Larry Jay Diamond, “Can the Middle East Democratize?” in The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build 
Free Societies Throughout the World (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt and Co., 2008): 287. 
320 James Kitfield, “The Turkish Model,” National Journal 34, no. 9 (March 2, 2002): 603. 
 89 
the Middle Eastern Arab world, given the risk posed by the strong Islamist parties and 
their influences on society, governmental supervision of the religious establishment 
would be more prudent than a total separation of religion and state along the Western, 
particularly American, lines of secularism.321 Similar to the Turkish example, the Middle 
Eastern states can fulfill this supervision by establishing an institution according to 
Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (see Chapter IV, page 59). 
The Turkish example shows that, in addition to the democratic and secular 
structure of the state, it is important to establish the institutional structure that is capable 
of overseeing political parties and furthering their moderation during the democratization 
process of predominantly Muslim countries. As happened in Turkey, as long as the 
Islamic movements and parties do not aim to change the regime to an Islamic one and 
accept playing by the rules, they should be allowed to operate and participate in 
politics.322 On the other hand, if they threaten the state structure, it is very important to 
make the institutions evaluate these parties’ and individuals’ actions under democratic 
principles. As the previous chapter noted, the Turkish Constitutional Court has played 
this role many times in Turkey as a safeguard of the Turkish democracy. Apart from the 
Turkish experience, European countries have also barred movements such as the Nazi 
Party in Germany after they were deemed a threat to their democracies.323 Hence, 
inspired by the Turkish model, in the Middle Eastern Arab countries, as Larry Diamond 
states, the capacity and independence of the judiciary, the parliament, the electoral 
commission, the audit agencies, the central banks, and other institutions of horizontal 
accountability has to be firmly established and constitutionally embedded well before the 
gates of electoral competition are thrown wide open so the risks of democratization can 
be considerably reduced.324 Moreover, independent and free formation of civil society 
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organizations capable of questioning the vertical accountability of governments has to 
flourish as well during the democratic transition of the Middle Eastern countries in order 
to push for a more liberal and democratic environment. 
When the Turkish experience is examined in a larger context, other than limiting 
this experience to the moderation of political Islam, it demonstrates a modern, 
democratic, and economically strong state, which is on the brink of EU accession and 
already a member of various international organizations such as NATO, OECD, the 
Council of Europe and others.325 Possessing these characteristics as a predominantly 
Muslim state makes Turkey’s profile more sympathetic to the Middle Eastern Arab states 
that cause Turkey’s domestic and international achievements to be viewed with greater 
respect.326 This in turn, facilitates the acceptance of Turkey as a model for the Middle 
Eastern countries. After the Helsinki Agreement in 1999, which granted Turkey the status 
of a candidate country for the accession to the EU, the political and economic strength of 
Turkey became more attractive among Arab countries in the Middle East. They started to 
follow the developments between the EU and Turkey more closely since they consider 
the accession of Turkey to the EU would prove that not only is the EU not an exclusively 
Christian organization, but also that the Turkish model is worth emulating since it may 
become a member of one of the world’s most developed organizations. Moreover, in 
2001, when the Turkish parliament refused the demands of the United States to use the 
Turkish soil in their war against the Iraqi regime, Arabs noticed that a democratic Turkey 
said no to the world’s strongest country while their despotic rulers dared not to.327 In 
addition to these factors, the Turkish experiment in transforming a centrally controlled 
economy into a market economy was regarded as a good example and, therefore, it 
became another factor for Arab intellectuals who have become more enthusiastic in their 
perception of Turkey as an inspiration for their countries.328  
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It is clear that Turkey provides an illustrative case of ongoing democratization 
from which other Muslim-majority nations can draw various lessons.329 However, as it 
had been difficult for Turkey to establish and consolidate its democratic understanding, it 
would also be hard for the Middle Eastern countries to achieve the level of democracy 
that Turkey has achieved after decades. Instead of emphasizing what Turkey is, it is more 
vital to focus on how the Turkish history of democratization and modernization started 
and evolved over time. As the previous chapters discussed, Turkish democratization 
history and its features possess useful advisory steps for Middle Eastern countries. 
Because the Kemalist era constituted the backbone of Turkish modernization and formed 
the grounds for democratization, it is important to draw well-thought lessons for the 
Middle Eastern Arab countries. Especially the attributes that belong to Turkish 
democratization—specifically the Six Arrows of Kemalism—should be used as the 
guiding steps toward democracy. First of all, nationalism—not meaning of Pan-Arabism 
or racism—should be strengthened in these countries in order to gather all of their 
citizens under a common flag and common goal. Promoting state nationalism will 
strengthen the consciousness of all people, irrespective of their religion, sects or tribes. 
This notion has to be strengthened with the introduction of secularism—as a necessary 
condition for democratization—which, will eradicate the differences between citizens 
who have different religions or sects, and will make the government treat its citizens 
equally. For this purpose, other than considering secularism as unbelief, it is crucial to 
focus on its deeper meaning of equal approach to all religions and sects in order to escape 
from the secularism-Islamism polarization that locks the political actors in perpetual 
conflict.330 Thereafter, with reformism, most importantly, modern education should be 
promoted in the Middle East. For instance, in Turkey the Kemalist ruling elite prioritized 
education and modernization in order to replace the traditionally religious social life of 
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Anatolia with an enlightened public mind.331 By following the steps of Turkish etatism 
with an up-to-date perception, industrialization has to be promoted where the private 
investments fall short. While doing so, private sector and entrepreneurs should be 
encouraged by the state because the Turkish example shows that the emergence of a 
strong middle class is a crucial precondition for democracy and its consolidation.332 With 
populism, socioeconomic and political resources have to be distributed justly. This notion 
is one of the most important factors that the Middle Eastern leaders should pay attention 
to. The third chapter examined the rent income’s effect over a society that hinders the 
people’s will and capacity in seeking democracy. In light of this effect, the rent income 
has to be directed toward various other areas of development without using them as 
subsidies for the population. However, these attributes of the Turkish experience should 
not to be perceived as a general recipe in the way of democratization. Successful 
governments in Turkey have implemented these features back and forth for many years 
and introduced them gradually, until the minds and perceptions of the people became 
adequate for democracy. 
Having historical and emotional roots in the Middle East that originated from the 
Ottoman’s centuries-long rule of these lands makes Turkey more acceptable as a model 
in the region. It is broadly accepted that Turkey’s Muslim, secular and democratic 
identity provides the intellectual grounds for the feasibility of democracy in the Middle 
East.333 After showing that secularism is a necessary but not a sufficient condition in the 
Turkish democratization process,334 taking into account the characteristics of the Middle 
Eastern Arab state’s perception of Islam and its place in society, it will be more feasible 
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to introduce a softer implementation of secularism in order to win the hearts and minds of 
millions of Muslims in the Arab world.335 However this does not mean to carve out a 
secular state system that is more tolerant and close to the Muslims. Instead, to reiterate, 
the state has to take control of religious teachings into its hands and every ideology’s 
inclusion into the political arena has to be guaranteed constitutionally without letting 
them exploit this right by using every effort in trying to destroy the democratic system 
itself. For this purpose, as Ömer Taşpınar asserts, the Kemalist transformation between 
1923 and 1950 serves major relevance for transition to democracy in the Arab world. He 
claims that the introduction of free elections should be seen as the culmination of the 
democratization process while establishing a positivist education system should be the 
top priority.336 Moreover, the foundation of strong state institutions is also vital for the 
protection of democratization in the Middle East. The Turkish example demonstrates that 
a devoted judiciary, military, intelligentsia, in short, state bureaucracy with the 
undisputed power of the civil society, make it difficult to destroy the secular and 
democratic stance of the country.  
As happened in the Turkish case, in the Middle East a better balance between 
democracy, secularism, and Islam can be found if political liberalization is adopted 
gradually while the state is pursuing its economic development programs successfully.337 
Because, as Amr Hamzawy expresses, the gradual integration of Islamist movements in 
politics with constitutional and legal restrictions will compel them to stay between the red 
lines of the secular and democratic state. Afterwards, those restrictions will stimulate 
them to improve their flexibility in accepting the existing state structure and this will be 
reflected in both their rhetoric and practices, thus transforming them from powers 
rejecting the political system to ones accepting it and active within it, either as legitimate 
opposition or as ruling powers.338 
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It is certain that the Turkish democratization history has very useful experiences 
for the Middle Eastern countries. From moderating extremist parties to the institution 
building process; from state-led economic development to the implementation of a free-
market economy the whole system of Turkish modernization and democratization process 
can inspire many Middle Eastern countries in the Arab world. The crucial thing in this 
inspiration is to not forget that every country is sui generis. Because of this, it is more 
important to choose and adopt what is appropriate for each country instead of taking the 
whole Turkish democratization process as a blueprint for the emergence of democracy. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Having the roots of democracy in the Western World or having the most liberal 
democracies in the Western countries does not mean that democracy pertains to the 
Western World. Whether the word “democracy” is used or not, almost all Muslims today 
react to it as one of the universal conditions of the modern world339 and evaluate the 
concept of democracy at least as favorably as Christians.340 As the second chapter 
discusses, democracy is not about religion, ethnicity, or culture.  Islam itself does not 
possess an inherent contradiction to the core values and principles of democracy. Indeed 
Islam possesses three important factors that can provide the grounds for democratization 
in the Muslim world: consensus, consultation, and independent reasoning. The assertion 
that Islam and democracy are incompatible by some scholars and theologians does not 
derive from Islam per se, but derives from their different interpretation of Islam and the 
implementation of its teachings. Moreover, many of these intellectuals’ oppositions 
against the compatibility of Islam and democracy actually reflect their resentments and 
anger towards the Western world, which emanates from their unpleasant experiences with 
Western countries, particularly during the colonial era. By refusing to acknowledge the 
coherence of Islam and the idea of democracy, they also express their grievances that 
derive from suppression in the hands of pro-Western, secular, and authoritarian leaders 
during the post-independence period of their countries. Actually democracy depends on 
the development levels of societies. Once the society becomes mature economically, 
politically, and socially, regardless of the country’s place in the world, democracy may 
start to emerge gradually. 
The Turkish experience proves that democratization is a long and painful process 
and its consolidation and successful internalization may take generations.341 Even in 
                                                 
339 John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, “Democratization and Islam,” The Middle East Journal 45, no. 3 
(1991): 440. 
340 Steven R. Hofmann, “Islam and Democracy: Micro-Level Indications of Compatibility,” Comparative 
Political Studies 37, no. 6 (2004): 658. 
341 Ömer Taşpınar, “An Uneven Fit?: The “Turkish Model” and the Arab World.” Project on U.S. Relations with 
the Islamic World, The Brookings Institution (August 2003): 3. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2003/08islamicworld_Taşpınar/Taşpınar20030801.pdf 
 96 
Europe, the emergence and further consolidation of democracy lasted several decades. 
Moreover, the emergence of a truly secular Europe became possible only after substantial 
progress had been made in mass education, living standards, and representative 
democracy.342 For this reason, it would be naïve to expect democracy to emerge in the 
Middle Eastern Arab countries in a very short time. In order to achieve democracy in the 
region, the main hindrances have to be closely analyzed. As the second chapter stated, the 
difficulty of achieving democracy in the Middle Eastern semi-authoritarian countries 
stems not from Islam itself but from the dominating rulers and their well-planned 
decades-long tactics: Manipulation of elections with which they have masked their 
authoritarianism; coercion and suppression of different parts of the society; concessions 
given to the major political and institutional actors as bribery; and controlling the media 
and civil society with a vast array of legal and extra-legal tools. And these are only some 
of the tactics that the Middle Eastern leaders have been using for many years to keep their 
offices intact. Furthermore, despite many domestic and international pressures, these 
rulers have managed to sustain their power through the rents coming from their countries’ 
natural resources, transit ways, foreign aid or sometimes from the money sent by their 
guest workers. In light of these factors, one can conclude that the most important obstacle 
standing against democratization in the Middle East has been the rulers themselves.  
However, recent incidents in the Middle Eastern Arab countries showed that mass 
communication and technology are progressing very rapidly within the societies that 
make the Arab people more conscious about the world surrounding them and encourage 
them to demand a more open society that can prosper and ascend to the level of modern 
democratic countries as well. With the spread of social media, it became very difficult for 
governments to hide information from their own people and to prevent mobilization 
against them. Furthermore, with the impact of globalization in the Middle Eastern 
countries, even the authoritarian governments are compelled to make radical economic 
decisions, which therefore lead to radical political changes towards capitalism in order to 
compete with other globalizing countries, or at least not to be dominated by them. 
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Knowing that the democratization process in Europe generally started with capitalism, it 
is a good sign for the anticipated emergence of democratization in the Middle East. 
Besides the recent uprisings, namely the Arab Spring, proved that whether the 
authoritarian Middle Eastern incumbents volunteer to reform their country or not, the 
society has become exhausted with their rules and has now started to demand justice, 
equality, democracy, and prosperity. 
Having shared a centuries-long common history with Turkey under the Ottoman 
rule as well as the same religion, there cannot be a better opportunity for the Middle 
Eastern Arab countries to consider Turkey’s democratization history as an inspiration for 
democratizing their own countries. Although the eventual outcome of achieving genuine 
democracy by following the Turkish example is alluring in the minds and hearts of many 
Arab intellectuals, it is more crucial to focus on the democratization process of this 
example. What made Turkey a democratic country has not occurred in last decade; 
instead it began during the late Ottoman period and has continued to the present day. In 
order to understand the way Turkey achieved its democracy first, the key feature of its 
modernization project, namely the principles of Kemalism has to be observed. While 
doing so, the most crucial principle, secularism, or laicism, has to be understood. It 
emerged as the only alternative for implementing a progressive program343 in an Islamic 
society of Ottoman heritage. Moreover, it guaranteed the government’s approach to all its 
citizens equally, regardless of their ethnicities, religions or sects. While doing so, Atatürk 
took religious teaching under control of the state by founding the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs. As we can see today, sometimes when religious education is conducted in private 
institutions completely outside the oversight of the government, the result can be what we 
see in the Taliban example.344 Instead of a religiously oriented education, Atatürk 
introduced the modern western style education with the implementation of many other 
reforms. Furthermore, since economic development is one of the key elements in the 
democratization process, the Turkish government first implemented state-based 
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investments while encouraging private entrepreneurs, and then in the 1980s, introduced 
the free-market economy to keep up with the globalization of the world. Since the whole 
system of democracy would be demolished without strong and stable democratic 
institutions to operate as a moderating force345 in the political system of the country, 
successive governments of Turkey introduced democracy gradually, while establishing 
the vital institutions capable of defending the democratic outlook of the country. As 
Ömer Taşpınar states, “Atatürk realized that holding free elections would derail the 
whole modernization process, so a very cautious approach to the adoption of democracy 
emerged as an important dimension of the Turkish model.”346 As Turkish democracy 
faced threats posed by different spheres of the political arena, it evolved and moderated 
these anti-democratic powers with its democratic institutions, such as the judiciary, civil 
society, military, NGOs, free media and press, and so on. Moreover, the ideal goal for 
achieving the level of contemporary societies that was set by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
motivated the whole country in its efforts to modernize and democratize. This 
understanding has been reflected by Turkey’s various applications to become a member 
of many different international organizations, which in turn further motivated and 
compelled the whole society to become more liberal and democratic. 
In light of this short summary of Turkey’s democratization history, it is obvious 
that it provides a useful template for the democratization of the Middle Eastern countries. 
However, it is important not to forget that every country is sui generis so the parts that 
will fit this template have to be related to the uniqueness of each country. Richard 
Robinson summarizes the general path of Turkish democratization in six steps. Actually, 
these steps taken by Turkey after its foundation are likely to be adopted by the Middle 
Eastern countries as well. First of all, he asserts that, there has to be a well-intentioned, 
progressively-minded and broadly trusted government that will institute the rule of law. 
Second, a liberal and secular education has to be formed in order to challenge the 
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superstition and dogmatic fatalism of the under-educated society. Third, the state has to 
encourage private entrepreneurship while performing state-led investments where these 
private entrepreneurs fall short. Fourth, gradual introduction of democracy is crucial until 
basic social, educational, and economic reforms could be securely launched. Fifth, 
dragging the society to modern machines and industry will minimize the unrest and 
spread its benefits over the entire population. And last, substantial foreign aid—from the 
U.S. or EU—in support of the reform process in these countries will minimize the risks 
of collapsing the democratization efforts.347 
Encouraging democratic elections in Muslim countries, without addressing the 
problems of uneven distribution of socioeconomic and political resources,348 low literacy 
rates, non-industrialized economy, and the habitual exploitation of Islam by the 
politicians for their own interests will not succeed. It is true that the spread of modern 
secular education would erode intellectual and physical boundaries349 between different 
classes, ethnicities, sects, and religious groups by enabling tangible and constructive 
connections among them. Besides, knowing that out of 280 million Arabs, 65 million 
adults are illiterate, it is likely that holding elections without the introduction of 
widespread modern education, anti-democratic radical Islamic rule would emerge350 
because people perceive it as the only viable political power after being frustrated with 
their pro-Western, authoritarian rulers for decades. Introducing various economic reforms 
and approaches to capitalism, without sacrificing the state’s own economic dynamics, as 
was done in Turkey’s development, will create the rule of law and an accountable state 
by developing new business classes and a middle-class that would question  governments 
and their policies as well. Moreover, genuine constitutionalism, which is a complicated 
system of checks and balances designed to prevent the accumulation of power and abuse 
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of office,351 has to be settled on strong roots by creating an independent judiciary to 
oversee it as in Turkey, where this process has been accomplished by its Constitutional 
Court for many years. 
Democratization in the Middle Eastern Arab states should be dealt with in the 
context of institutionalism because effective and impartial institutions would bring the 
genuine rule of law, which would guarantee constitutional liberties that would then lead 
to the emergence of democracy and its consolidation. In this regard, in addition to foreign 
involvement that may monitor the democratization process, Turkey should be included in 
this process by the Middle Eastern Arab countries in order to utilize its past experience 
for these newly emerging democracies. 
Democratization is not only a political but also a social, economic and cultural 
evolution. This process has to be monitored closely and introduction of reforms has to be 
handled gradually. Particularly in the Muslim Middle East secularism, in better terms 
laicism, should be the cornerstone in the democratization process since it encompasses all 
of the people and regulates their equality. Consolidation of the institutions such as civil 
society, an independent judiciary and military, legislation of secular laws that will 
prevent the exploitation of people’s religious values by political actors, and promoting 
positivist education with economic improvements are the least necessary conditions of 
successful democratization in the Middle East. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.   Democracy and World Regions, 2002352 
 
 
Alfred Stepan comes to the conclusion of half of the world’s Muslim population 
is living under democracies, near-democracies, or intermittent democracies by counting 
the approximate number of Muslim population in all countries. He not only included the 
110 Muslims in Bangladesh, but also Pakistan’s 120 million Muslims and Turkey’s 65 
million Muslims. He also included the India’s 120 million Muslims with the other 
approximate 20 million Muslims living under democratic regimes in areas such as 
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Western Europe, North America, and Australia. Finally, by adding them to each other, he 
comes to the number of 435 million Muslims. He even asserts that, if one counts 
Indonesia’s 190 million Muslim population, the number of the people living under some 
form of democratic regime would be over 600 million.353 
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